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Literature Review:

The role of civil society in managing memories of disputed territories

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this literature review is to cover the existing research across the theme 'The role of civil society in managing memories of disputed territories.' It consists of six contributions where the different aspects of interactions between civil society, Diaspora, memory and reconciliation are discussed. The theory of agonistic memory related to the post conflict situations gives an opportunity to consider the agonistic strategies and practices of remembrance which can be applied to different contexts, because 'Agonistic moments or inroads depend on local memory frames and political contexts, so the ways in which the different social agents interact with them convey a varied meaning to formally similar mnemonic practices' (Bull and Hansen, 2015).

To being, Dr. *Harutyun Marutyan* discusses the literature related to the role of memory/remembrance for civil society. He stresses on the topics related to the concept of the past, the role of collective memory in the context of interrelations of the past and present. In particular, he emphasizes three different approaches in social remembrance studies: 'present' and 'past' based, and collective memory as a process of continuous discussion.

PhD student *Ruzanna Tsaturyan* is analyzing the concept of civil society through its participation and role in memory management. She concludes, that, similar to other post-conflict societies, in Armenia also civil society organizations are mostly involved in capacity building, reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives with local and international support, meanwhile the issues of conflicting memories remain unresolved.

In his paper Dr. *Arsen Hakobyan* discusses the interaction between Diaspora, civil society and memory/conflict, trying to find answers to the following questions: How

the Diaspora became a civil society actor? What is the role of Diaspora as a political actor in the context of conflicts, and what is the role of memory in this process? His conclusion is optimistic: The memory can be a part of the reconciliation process because the memory can play a key role in processes of change and transition.

Dr. *Muhammad Younis* discusses literature on one of the concrete manifestations of the theory of memory – the social aspects (healing, apologies, truth commissions, negotiated memory aimed on reconciliation between people, collective remembrance and commemoration) of transitional justice and the role of civil society in it.

In the penultimate section *Syed Shah* (PhD candidate, University of Bath) continues to discuss the how diaspora communities continue to maintain economic, political and social ties to the 'homeland'. Through several cases, Syed highlights the importance of memory in this process.

Ms. *Ani Lecrivain*, discussing the issue of the Armenian Genocide (which in different ways is present in all papers of third work package), states, that for the Armenian civil society is impossible to forget the events of the past. Anyway, there are efforts in Diaspora to focus on discussion and exchanges with Turkish civil society, to have a greater presence on the ground in Turkey, hoping for recognition of Genocide throughout the reconciliation of civil societies, unavoidable with the development of knowledge, and thus hope for compensations.

CIVIL SOCIETY, THE PAST AND REMEMBRANCE - Harutyun Marutyan

Harutyun Marutyan is Head Researcher at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography (National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan) & Director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Foundation. In this piece, Harutyun sets out a historical over-view of the academic debates on memory and the past.

On the Concept of the 'Past'

For a human being, the past is the period before certain events that have been recorded directly in the memory of the individual. To be a member of any human community is to situate oneself with regard to one's past, if only by rejecting it. The past is therefore a permanent dimension of human consciousness, an inevitable component of the institutions, values, and other patterns of human society. Although the past and present tenses differ grammatically, the past and the present are not separate independent units. For the greater part of history, we deal with societies and communities for which the past is essentially the pattern of the present. Of course, total domination by the past would exclude all legitimate changes and innovations, and it is improbable that there is any human society that would recognize no innovation (Hobsbawm 1972).

When social change accelerates or transforms society beyond a certain point, the past must cease to be the *pattern* of the present and can, at best, become the *model* for it. The very appeal to the past, even when the call is made that 'we ought to return to the ways of our forefathers,' is a mask for innovation, for it no longer expresses the repetition of what has gone before. Attempts for the restoration of the lost past are often simply symbolic (Hobsbawm 1972) rather than successful, and hence become manifestations of the continuity of the past through replications only (cf.: Zerubavel 2003).

The introduction of a civil society's past to its new members functions as a component of their inclusion in the society and is a significant part of the efforts of that society. Thus the teaching of a national history, whether in Israel or Armenia, Poland or Mexico, is the most significant part of the overall endeavors of the given state in the shaping of national identity (cf.: Smith 1999). As was vividly formulated by Raffi, a nineteenth-century founder of Armenian nationalism, 'History is a creed that shapes the future generation, teaching them to beware of the errors of their forefathers and to follow the example of their worthy deeds' (Raffi 1959). Meanwhile, parting from a certain group or a society often leads to obliviousness of its past (cf.: Halbwachs 1980). For example, children who are neglected by one of their parents seldom have recollections of that parent's family. Similarly, the children of assimilated immigrants do not receive substantial knowledge of the history of the societies to which his/her parents once belonged.

Civil society members perceptions of the past are reflections of personal social experience. Just as the present, the past is also part of social reality and, far from being thoroughly objective, nevertheless is greater than our subjectivity, and is usually shared by others as well (cf.: Fentress and Wickham 1992).

Recollection of the past is an active, constructive process and not a simple matter of retrieving information. The act of remembrance is to place a part of the past in the service of the conceptions and needs of the present (Schwartz 1982).

Almost all political rhetoric depends on the past as a legitimating device. The French revolutionaries of the 1790s referred to the past, to the Roman republic in order to find legitimation for political action not dependent on royal decrees (it was Roman law that recognized the primacy of private property) (Fentress and Wickham 1992). As a rule, revolutionary movements also seek their mottos and ambitions in the past (Le Goff 1992). It is probable that national historical consciousness and its infrastructures have gradually begun to develop in French and European societies

since the French Revolution. It is since the nineteenth century that scholars and politicians have started to accept the importance of the fundamental link between the nation and its past. This link has been one of the most important factors for the growth of nationalist and nation-building ideologies, and in the process of the establishment of the capitalist nations in general (Fentress and Wickham 1992; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm 2000). As Eric Hobsbawm has observed, 'Nations without a past are a contradiction in terms. What makes a nation is the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the people who produce it' (Hobsbawm 1992).

Memory, and historical memory in particular, is one of the fundamental features defining the edges of 'ethnic community (ethnie),' 'nation,' and 'national identity' (Smith 1991). Among the rituals, customs, and common myths, shared historical memories and traditions are a means of tying together the members of a nation and determining their relations and actions. According to Anthony Smith, memories and the understanding of their communal past or pasts form the 'ethno-history' of a nation or ethnic community. It is multi-layered and contested, which implies a continuous process of reinterpretation of national identities. Every generation contributes its own interpretation of national identity, and for that reason, national identity is never fixed or static: it is always being reconstructed in response to new needs, interests and perceptions, although within certain limits. Smith notes that the central question of nationalism, which in general is one of the most powerful social and political forces in the modern world and has the most important role in nation building and national development processes, is the role of the past in the creation of the present and that the essential element in any kind of human identity is memory, reflective consciousness of personal connection with the past (Smith 1999).

Both historical and collective memory are based upon people's knowledge and attitudes to their nation's historical past in its entirety or certain episodes, real or perceived, thereof. At the same time, as has already been mentioned, these

memories are not static; rather they are subject to transformations caused by internal developments and external influences. Such as those in the twentieth century when events of nation-wide significance took place in Armenian society, and the combination of the above mentioned factors led to the formation of significant elements of new identity.

Generally, thoughts about society are almost always expressed through images of individuals. History is perceived in the same way: remembrance of the past begins with the remembrance of people. Individuals composing a society almost always feel the need to have ancestors, heroes (cf.: Irwin-Zarecka 1994), and one of the roles of great men is to fill that need. Thus, special importance is attached to the questions: What kind of historical individuals should be, or are worthy of being, remembered? And what parts of their activities should be presented to future generations? In formulating and searching for answers to these questions, we face the political uses of the past (Schwartz 1991b).

This task is part of a more general problem of the very concept of historical memory taking places in academic circles and which is currently largely considered, discussed and challenged, and has led to clashes of opinion and has resulted in the emergence of individual avenues. In brief, the essence of the question is as follows: some authors maintain that the past is mutable, made and remade for present-day use, depending on the demands of the present. Another group of theorists believes that collective memory survives the changes in society; moreover, it is the past that forms our notions of the present and not vice versa. The third, comparatively smaller group, of memory scholars argues that the same present may carry different memories and different realia may carry the same memory, and thus in political culture collective memory is a dynamic and ongoing process of debate, which flows through time.

None of these theoretical approaches is of narrow or dogmatic character; they differ primarily in emphasis.

Collective Memory in the Context of Interrelations of the Past and Present

One of Halbwachs' fundamental and oft-quoted conclusions is that, 'A remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with data borrowed from the present, a reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already been altered' (Halbwachs 1980).

'Present' based approach in social remembrance studies

A group of well-known researchers of national memory and identity, including George Herbert Mead, Michel Foucault, Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger and Charles Horton Cooley, who continued the theoretical development of Halbwachs' observation, also believes that the past is created in the present, and is thus adaptable. A powerful strand of the so-called 'presentist' approach is observed in the scientific studies referring to memory issues. These studies record the ways through which the reflections of the past are changed over the course of time. They also note that different groups use the past for solving present-day problems by engaging in various manipulations while commenting on the past with the purpose of achieving definite goals. Based on various examples, the numerous studies carried out by the above authors and their adherents reveal the transformation of the significance of historical events passing from one generation to another in accordance with changes in the infrastructures of social problems and needs. In other words, according to the authors of this school of thought, an historical event is evaluated differently at different period of times, depending on the requirements of the moment (cf.: Davies 1989). Thus, according to Mead and Halbwachs, collective memory is subject to fundamental revision when new values and social structures replace old ones. They believe that 'the past is a foreign country,' as the title of another author's book states (cf.: Lowenthal 1985).

George Herbert Mead was not familiar with Halbwachs' works. The essence of his theory, based on works published in the 1920s and 1930s, relies upon the idea that 'reality is always that of a present,' despite the fact that the present includes the past and the future, whereas the past arises through memory and exists in images which form 'the backward limit of the present' (Mead, 1929). In its time, his theory was a radical departure from traditional views (cf.: Maines, Sugrue, Katovich 1983). Mead announced that any concept of the past is constructed 'from the standpoint of the new problem of today' and that all aspects of the past lose their relevance when the conditions of the present are changed. Mead's second distinctive point is that new pasts are most likely to emerge during periods of rapid change. Let us recall that during the period of *glasnost*, Soviet citizens revealed a new past nearly every day. For example, in the Armenian reality during the years of the Karabagh Movement new pages in the history of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the first quarter of the twentieth century were revealed. New facts about the role of revolutionary leaders and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union surfaced during the events crucial for the Armenian nation. The emergence of situations determined by such circumstances has a destabilizing effect, yet they may grow into a regular situation, if the past is reconstructed so that it assimilates and mixes in the meaningful flow of the developments.

Charles Horton Cooley, a representative of 'presentism,' observes that the function of the present, not the past, determines how famous people and events are preserved in the collective mind (Schwartz 1991b). Hobsbawm uses the term 'invention of tradition,' that is, the past has been invented, but the cause of this process may be explained by the conditions and requirements of the present. He shows how a tradition may be reshaped and adapted to the objectives of the present (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). These concepts, which seek not only to liberate the present from the grip of the past (Edward Shils), but to establish 'the importance of the present relative to the past' (Fitzgerald 1979), consider perceptions of the past to

be strategic tools created in compliance with the requirements of the present, making the past unstable, precarious, unreliable, ungrounded, and 'its contents hostage to the conditions of the present' (Schwartz 1991a).

One may come across direct manifestation of 'presentism' in the *social limitations of the memory*. Thus, it is well known that our memory is greatly affected by our social environment. Our environment, in some cases, may prevent us from remembering certain events in our lives. That is, the influence of our social environment upon the ways of remembrance of our past becomes more distinct when we understand that the majority of the things 'memorized' by us are, in fact, filtered in the process of interpretation, which usually occurs in the social environment.

Remembering is more than just spontaneous individual performance. It is also regulated by the social rules telling us as a society *what to remember* and *what we may or should forget*. It is these rules that define, for example, the acuteness of our recollection.

At this juncture, I would like to get ahead of the narrative and note that in the course of the Karabagh Movement when, as will be shown subsequently, memory was the driving force of the Movement, people as a rule 'went back' in that memory for about no more than a century. To be more specific, due to the strong family/kinship ties to hundreds of thousands of people, the Genocide memory continued to stay in the domain of collective and personal memories, and had not yet become history in a broader sense. For many that memory was still on the autobiographical level among various age-groups around them and the stories heard from grandparents or retold by parents about the Genocide and deportations were still too vivid and too emotionally felt (cf.: Garagashyan 2006). In the case of the younger generations who had, due to various circumstances, lost these ties, the historical, imagined memory acquired as knowledge was brought to the forefront.

An effective means of altering the past and sending it to oblivion is the policy of *renaming* large and small territories, settlements, streets, and other places. Quite frequently renaming (giving a new name or restoring the older, forgotten, lost one) is the ultimate act of a conquest (liberation) or revolution (overthrow of power). Thus, being not only an indicator of an increase in nationalistic tendencies, but also an act of breaking with the past and founding a new reality (cf.: Burke 1989; Milo 1997; Slyomovics 1998; Abrahamian 2006). This is conditioned by the fact that toponyms are a way of asserting the actuality of a certain starting point of the past.

The use of toponyms, especially in case of disputed territories, immediately awakens definite memories (Lehmann 2006). Imagined landscapes and their names create in individuals or various groups specific 'identity maps' and are extremely important for the construction of identity. For example, notions of a lost homeland conveyed through toponyms can pass from generation to generation, provoking nostalgia arousing loyalty, and devotion to images of the past. I have often witnessed changes of mood and emotional states in second- and third-generation emigrants from Historical Armenian province Vaspurakan at the mention of toponyms such as Van, Aygestan, Aghtamar and Artamet. Talk of the native places of their parents or ancestors, especially when repeated regularly, can even incite certain actions, such as travel to the homeland of their forefathers; (cf.: Hirsch and Spitzer 2003; Gallagher 1993) formation of nostalgic literature and musical compositions; and activities aimed at the recovery of the lost places. Similarly, as will be shown further in this narrative, the simple mentioning or listing of certain toponyms (for example, Deir-Zor, Baku, Shushi, Altay, Gandzak, Sumgait, Nakhijevan, Khojalu) in the years of the Karabagh Movement was not only sufficient for the conveyance of extensive information on one or several historical periods but for the awakening of certain, guided memories (Marutyan 2007).

Visions of 'Armenia,' 'Armenia Major,' 'Liberated, Independent and United Armenia,' and of the lost homeland in general, have always moved the hearts of Armenians for

many centuries bereft of statehood, and have been in their minds and in their dreams. This is the reason why Armenians, especially in the Soviet years, held dear all those maps, whether old or new, or modern or in Armenian or in a foreign language, which depicted Historical Armenia, or wrote 'Armenia' or 'Armenian highlands,' over the disputed territory of the Ottoman Empire and later of Turkey. That is to say, the *iconographical solution* of seeing Armenia united and whole, as maps being condensed representations of landscapes have done, has always been appreciated. It is noteworthy, too, that when referring to south-eastern Turkey as Armenia and, in modern western maps more often as Kurdistan, the fact evokes (among Armenians, as well as among Kurds) an altogether different history, and insists on a different knowledge of place (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003).

Identity is often localized not only in toponyms, but also in certain physical places or sites so that changes to these places can become tantamount to alteration of a memory of a time-period and can even lead to the domination of memories of a traumatic nature.

'Past' based approach in social remembrance

In response to the great importance attached to 'presentism' in the studies of social remembrance, a number of researchers single out approaches conventionally referred to as 'pastism' (as I have conditionally formulated) or based on the past, that is limited adaptability of the past. For example, Michael Schudson believes that, 'The past is in some respects, and under some conditions, highly resistant to efforts to make it over.' According to him, the full freedom to reconstruct the past in accordance with one's own present interests is limited by three factors (Schudson 1989). Schudson is confident, that 'The past becomes part of us; it shapes us, and influences our consciousness, whether we like it or not. In the pathological, but familiar, form, people become entrapped by their old wounds' (Schudson 1989).

On the other hand, people react not only to extreme conditions in their own lives but to extreme conditions in the lives of others, too. They do so not because of some traumatic experience they themselves have undergone but because they are aware of traumatic stories of others in similar situations. As an expression of this certain emotional actions take place (Schudson 1989).

There are some facets of the past that we cannot ignore or forget without feeling the loss of some part of ourselves. Not only the past, according to Freud, lives in people's mental life: people's mental life lives in the past (Schudson 1989).

The structure of social conflict with respect to the past means that it is not always up to one particular group to decide what past should be preserved and what should fall into oblivion. People's ability to reconstruct the past just as they wish is limited by the crucial social fact that other people are trying to do the same thing. This means that control over the past is disputed and the past becomes contested terrain, and that there is a policy of memory that requires study (Schudson 1989).

Michael Schudson noted that there is plenty of evidence that people and groups and nations rewrite the past to legitimate the present, but it should not lead to loose talk suggesting that it is the whole story. The present shapes our understanding of the past, yes, but this is half the truth, at best, and a particularly cynical half-truth at that. The other half of the truth is that 'the past shapes the present, even when the most powerful people and classes and institutions least want it to' (Schudson 1989).

One of the arguments of the representatives of 'pastism' is the following: every society, whatever its ideological climate, requires a sense of continuity with the past, and its enduring memories maintain this continuity. If beliefs about the past failed to outlive changes in a society, then the society's unity and continuity would be undermined. Émile Durkheim was among the early writers who made this unity and continuity problematic. Conceptions of the past, Durkheim believed, are cultivated

by periodic commemoration rites, whose function is not to transform the past by bending it to serve the present, but to reproduce the past, to make it live as it once did (Schwartz 1991a).

According to another outstanding representative of this school of the theory of collective memory, Edward Shils, on the concept of tradition (1981), the past makes the present. In his opinion commemoration is a way of claiming that the past has something to offer the present, whether it is a warning or a model, in times of rampant change because the past provides a necessary point of reference for identity and action. According to Shils, the image of an epoch or a historical figure is not conceived and elaborated anew by each generation but is transmitted according to a 'guiding pattern' that endows subsequent generations with a common heritage. Stable memories strengthen society's 'temporal integration' by creating links between the living and the dead and promoting consensus over time. This consensus is resilient because memories create the grounds for their own perpetuation. According to Schudson, memories are not credible unless they conform to an existing structure of assumptions about the past. Thus, a true community is a 'community of memory,' whose past is retained by retelling the same 'constitutive narrative' and by recalling the people who have always embodied and exemplified its moral values (Shils 1981).

The experience of the Karabagh Movement allows, in our opinion, certain nuances in the 'pastist' approach to be illuminated and, when considered in detail, can claim to being an independent line of approach in its own right. Thus, after the Sumgait events the Movement adopted a line of action in which the factor of the past, specifically the Genocide of Armenians at the beginning of the twentieth century, would assist in the solution of a present problem, that is the Karabagh issue. However, the present in its turn was used for the solution to the problems of the past. This was true in 1988-1990 and is true now when the issue of Genocide recognition, also from the perspective of national security, has become one of the

dominant lines of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia. As it was in the Movement years, today as well, the past is with us as we interpret present phenomena through reference to the past, while at the same time we try in the present to find solution to unresolved issues of the past. It should be noted that in that attempt the perception by the international community of the history of twentieth-century Turkey alters, too. That is to say, we try in the present to solve the issues related to Turkey with the tools of the past, while trying at the same time to solve the issue of the recognition of that same past.

Collective Memory as a Process of Continuous Discussion

As was mentioned above, two theoretical approaches to collective memory are distinguishable. The first relates the discontinuities of the past to an ongoing constructive process motivated by the changing concerns of the present. The second draws attention to continuities in our perceptions of the past and to the way these perceptions are maintained in the face of social change.

In contrast to the above mentioned widely spread opinions, where the past is either durable or malleable, the third group of authors (Barry Schwartz, Yael Zerubavel, Jeffrey Olick and others) argues for a more complex view of the relation between past and present in shaping collective memory. They are of the opinion that, 'collective memory should be seen as an active process of sense-making through time' (Olick and Levy 1997). Or, according to a more expressive formulation of another author (Zelizer), 'memory is not an unchanging vessel for carrying the past to the present: memory is a process [of continuous discussions], not a thing, and it works differently at different points in time' (Zelizer 1998). The authors, who adhere to these principles in their works, try to answer the questions of whether the difference between these approaches can be resolved by rejecting one in favor of the other or whether conditions for the applicability of each approach can be specified. They also examine whether a new theory that reconciles their conflicting

claims can be formulated or whether a single, unifying property exists beneath their manifest differences.

These, as well as the other aforementioned authors, come to their opinions as a result of detailed observation of definite and concrete phenomena. The search for the answers to these questions is going on in the sphere of commemoration.

Accordingly, Halbwachs and Mead and their followers are right to anchor collective memory in the present. Their error is to underestimate the present's carrying power. They fail to see that the same present can sustain different memories and that different presents can sustain the same memory. Barry Schwartz believes that once this error is corrected, the Mead/Halbwachs and the Durkheim/Shils approaches to collective memory can be seen as special cases of a broader generalization that relates both change and continuity in the perception of the past to immediate human experience. The example, used in the article by Schwartz, shows that the original, aristocratic image of George Washington was preserved by the same society, which created the new democratic image. These contrasting images coexisted. That is, according to Barry Schwartz, the past is neither totally precarious nor immutable, but is a stable image upon which new elements are intermittently superimposed. The past, then, is a familiar rather than a foreign country, its people different, but not strangers to the present (Schwartz 1991a).

Some remarks on Civil Society

The evaluation and re-evaluation, as well as the ongoing discussion of the past and present events play an important role in the formation of civil societies. This was the case from the very beginning (February 1988 rallies) of the Karabakh Movement or the First Armenian Revolution (Abrahamian 2001; Marutyan 2009). Due to the policy of 'Perestroika and Glasnost,' the Armenian citizens awakened from the long sleep of

the Soviet decades, started to gradually build a civil society in mass rallies at the Opera square. In two and a half years that civil society initiated radical transformations and then formed a parliament through free elections, which led the country to independence in September 1991. In the works analyzing the Movement (Marutyan 2009) is shown how the events of the time (Armenian massacres in Sumgait city of Azerbaijan) (Ulubabyan, Zolian, Arshakyan 1989; Malkasian 1996) awakened and brought to the foreground the memory of the Armenian Genocide, which was in the sphere of collective memory, how that memory helped people to get rid of paradigms of the Soviet present, abolish the bonds of soviet propaganda and become the basis for revolutionary transformations, supporting the construction of a democratic state. Self-organized civic groups play an important role in the construction of civil society. Such groups gradually take over the solution of issues of great public importance. This is how the 'Karabakh' Committee (the lead of the Movement), ecological movement, the group protecting the Armenian language, constitutional and other groups were born.

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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MANAGING MEMORIES OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES - Ruzanna Tsaturyan

Ruzanna is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography (National Academy of Science, Armenia) whose main research interests are cultural heritage, nationalism, gender studies and food anthropology. In this review, Ruzanna sets out the challenges for civil society in peacebuilding processes and through the example of Armenia and Turkey, demonstrates the potential for agonism in facilitating dialogue and understanding.

The aim of this literature review is to tackle one more aspect of civil society's roles in cultural and conflicting memory management processes. Whilst there are many cases of projects involving civil society in resolving political conflicts and conflicting memories and establishing a dialogue, there is lack of research on the role of civil society in managing conflictual and competing memories of disputed territories. The evaluation of the effectiveness and expediency of these projects vary widely. As this part of the literature review aims to examine the available research on the subject matter, it is important to consider different connotations given to the term 'civil society.' This is a highly debated topic in social science and it should be noted, that the discussions on the interpretation of 'civil society', its coverage and boundaries entail varying opinions.

A report by the World Bank describes civil society as 'the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations' (World Bank, 2006). Researchers debating the concept of 'civil society' since the times of Cicero, Greco-Roman philosophers and the period of enlightenment, mostly characterise it as a platform separate from the state, formed on the basis of citizens' desires and aspirations (Anheier, Helmut K., 2004). Edwards sees it as an integrated 'ecosystem,' where the boundries and coverages are not certain. Moreover, with its 'chameleon

like qualities,'' civil society is not completely separate from the state and business (Edwards, 2014).

Within public consciousness the role and existence of civil society has evolved throughout different periods of history. Argued to have become a 'mantra' in the 1990s used by Presidents to political scientists, the boundaries and meaning of 'civil society' have been stretched. In line with this period, the following provides one of the broader definitions of civil society; 'Properly understood, civil society is a broader concept, encompassing all the organizations and associations that exist outside of the state (including political parties) and the market. It includes the gamut of organizations that political scientists traditionally label interest groups-not just advocacy NGOs but also labor unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations, and others. It also incorporates the many other associations that exist for purposes other than advancing specific social or political agendas, such as religious organizations, student groups, cultural organizations'. (Carothers, T., & Barndt, W., 1999:20)

By defining volunteerism and self-organization as a characteristic for describing civil society agents, a number of groups are distinguished: interest groups, charity groups, grassroots associations, and sociopolitical movements. The notions of social trust and social capital therefore are also closely associated with the descriptions of civil society (Paturyan & Gevorgyan, 2014).

Civil society and the state

Debates on civil society are inherently linked with the nature of democracy, as well as the boundaries of the state and other social institutions. Some scholars believe that civil society actions should be aimed at improving democracy, supporting democratic transition, and increasing citizen participation in governance (Putnam, 1993; Putman, 2000). The possibilities of civil society in democratization are assessed

in several core dimensions: providing a free space for public activity, representing the people, bridging social gaps, and enhancing social integration (Yishai, 2002).

Regarding democracy and the potential of civil society, Dagher notices that setting out broad definition in an attempt to form a comprehensive understanding of the society and the 'crystalized' agenda of the civil society represents. This overlooks what may be termed 'uncivil' groups of the same society which become an active challenge for what is broadly defined as 'civil society' and the democratic values it defines (Dagher, 2016:16). Dagher reflects that ''This tendency to focus on the positive aspects of civil society arises from a Western historical context, in which the rise of civil society was and continues to be associated with urbanization, strong legal systems, tolerance, and non-violence.' (Dagher, 2016; Mudde, 2003).

Defining civil society as a phenomenon acting separate from the state (Keane; 1988) makes the nature of democracy crucial in assessing the potential and effectiveness of civil society. Debates around whether democracy defines the functioning of active civil society, or active civil society promotes democratization are regularly discussed in social science. There are also critical views on how political power is becoming dictatorial, even when it has a culture of active public self-organization (Berman, 1997). The World Bank report summarizes the roles of civil societies in promoting democratization, noting that despite non-democratic contexts, active functioning of civil society in many cases contributes to a little more democratization; 'In Latin America, the concept of civil society has been framed primarily by the fight against military dictatorship in the 1960s and by socio-economic exclusion. In Eastern Europe, the concept was shaped by collective actions to overcome authoritarian regimes and establish democratic structures' (Merkel 1999).

As research on the role of civil society in modern society have predominantly emerged in Western European societies, there is also a need to compare and contrast the reality formed in this context with non-Western and developing

contexts (Lewis 2002; Pinkney, 2003). Scholars are exploring the ways in which civil society can exist and function in contexts of failed states, authoritarian rule and ethnic nationalism, underdevelopment or overbearing international presence? (Marchetti, 2009)

These questions are interesting for the Armenian case, where the civil society is active in positively promoting the process of democratization in the country. Here the issue of participation in memory management is closely linked to public trust and the areas 'conquered' by civil society. While various studies on Armenian civil society value consistent steps taken to institutionalize civil society, they also note a low level of public trust (Gevorgyan, 2017; Armine Ishkanian et al., 2013; Ishkanian, 2008; Babajanian, 2005; Blue, 2001; 2004). For example, public trust in NGOs has been low in the past decade, according to the Caucasus Barometer, the percentage of those who trust NGOs was 18% in 2013, but the percentage of those who distrust NGOs increased from 28% in 2012 to 36% in 2013 (Paturyan, 2014: 17). By 2017, this had improved once again to almost 2013 levels at 29%.[1]

Of course, this situation is not only a cause, but also a consequence of the discourse brought forward by non-democratic public administration in recent years, which resulted in targeting civil society organizations as marginal, opposed to national, ethnic interests; especially in the debates on violence, women's rights and peacebuilding. In fact, for different reasons, such things are common in the other countries of the region. Thus, 'A common strand among countries in Asia is that civil society is still not protected, as the state continues to be the central, and often the most repressive, actor in the region. Political and economic interests steered democratization toward a type of social organization that placed state institutions, special interest groups, and economic sectors into a single associated sphere' (Paffenholzv, 2010).

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[1] For more information see Caucasus Barometer;
https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017am/TRUNGOS/, accessed 20.01.2020.

The institutionalization of civil society, (i.e. through the establishment of NGOs), is more typical for Armenia than active social movements. This is a typical 'weakness' of a post-communist associational political culture (Howard 2003) that remains unchanged in Armenia. (Paturyan 2014:17); (Beraia,Yavuz & Dilanyan, 2019). In general, primarily viewing civil society issues and activity through the NGO sector allows for further consideration of NGO participation in conflict resolution, which is of interest to us in DisTerrMem. Financial instability of the Armenian civil society is the challenge that makes them 'donor-driven,' and at the same time more importantly, the legitimacy of civil society organizations to represent local voices is often disputed on the grounds that many NGOs are funded from abroad (Paturyan, 2014). Civil society becomes reduced to professionalized service delivery or advocacy NGOs (Ishkanian, 2009, 10).

For discussing the role of civil society agents in memory management, and specifically within the DisTerrMem project, it would be useful to examine the experience and approaches in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. While civil society participation in conflict resolution is recognized, as a tool it is not fully utilized and directly involved in peacebuilding. The role, expectation and perceptions of various civil society groups and organizations in peacebuilding are also not clear: from antagonistic and even agonist approaches (Marchetti, 2009).

Modern discussion and measurement of the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities have changed from outcome-oriented approaches to conflict management, to relationship-oriented conflict resolution, and to more comprehensive transformation approaches. For example, the People to People peace program funded by Norway following the 1994 Oslo peace agreement between Israel and Palestine supported dialogue projects between Israeli and Palestinian groups. A recent evaluation found that activities resulted in better relations between the individuals involved, but had little impact on the peace process at large (World Bank, 2006). It is therefore also

important to think about what connections, or lack of, exist between grass roots efforts and the agendas of nation states or regional organizations.

It is also important to understand whether civil society plays the same peacebuilding role in all societies in conflict situations. Especially in the societies like Armenia, where the cultural importance of social connections is stronger, the role of civil society agents becomes ambivalent in the situations of conflict escalation, and social relations and kinship are given greater prominence for security and self-defense considerations (Pouligny, 2005). In the context of weak state order following conflict, the influence of uncivil, xenophobic, or mafia-like groups gets stronger and pose a challenge to civil society, especially when there are issues with inter-ethnic dialogue (Belloni 2006, 8–9).

The DisTerrMem project proposes discussing memory management models based on an agonistic memory model as a research starting point for possible direction in the future. Of course, agonistic theory has a constructive potential with respect to conflicting memories as the diversification of opportunities to have a voice for as many parties as possible implies involvement of as many actors as possible, and here the role of civil society is worth examining (Bull & Hansen, 2015).

Adding to this is an extensive list of sensitive topics in Armenia, either driven by policy direction (due to the work of manipulated GONGOs) (Gevorgyan, 2017:11), or by the burden of historical memory. Civic initiatives around such issues are more than cautious, given the potential public reaction to the projects that seek to change prevailing public perceptions. International experience shows that despite the expectations and ambitions, civil society organizations as a rule play a secondary role in conflict management, and are usually only indirectly involved in peacebuilding processes (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009).

In this regard, it may be more appropriate to apply Bull and Hansen's approach of agonistic memory in the context of post-conflict societies, when the acute conflict phase is over and a window could be opened for the voices to be heard (Bull & Hansen, 2015:7). Therefore, in this next part of the literature review I'll try to discuss some narrow examples, such as civil society participation in Armenian-Turkish reconciliation attempts.

Opportunities for civil society in cross border peacebuilding

There are various attempts to involve civil society in the initiatives aimed at normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations and reconciliation, including the creation of committees, educational projects, exchange visits of businesspeople, signing of memorandums between the universities, and so on.

Armenia and Turkey are bordering countries with closed borders. There is no direct war or violent conflict at present between the two countries. One of the main problems between Turkey and Armenia is the lack of trust and confidence (Çeviközv, 2017). The controversial issue is the denial of the 1915 Armenian Genocide and mass deportations by Turkey. During the Karabakh war in 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in support of Azerbaijan. There were different initiatives to resolve the issue, from football diplomacy to mediation missions, however, diplomatic relations between the two countries remain inexistent.

Tigran Mkrtchyan writes, that civil society actors cannot be ascribed a key role in Armenian-Turkish normalization/reconciliation process, however they have changed public perceptions, trying to prepare 'matured' (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009:211) political negotiations (Mkrtchyan, 2011). In case of Turkey, the initiation of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process was important for its possible EU

membership, while in case of Armenia it was initiated by donor-funded reconciliation projects between non-governmental organizations by increasing links between businessmen, youth, academics, artists etc. In 2008, Turkish president Abdullah Gul arrived in Yerevan to watch a World Cup match. This was intended as a form of 'second track diplomacy.' Despite the cancellation of the Zurich protocols on normalization of relations (De Waal; Wilson & Sanamyan, 2010), international organizations continued providing support to initiatives that aimed at normalization of relations. Such examples include an EU-funded consortium of 8 CSOs that implemented 20 projects in 2014-2015; the establishment of the Armenia-Turkey Cinema platform; Memories without borders - a mutual project by Golden Apricot International Film Festival of Yerevan (Armenia) and Anadolu Kultur (Turkey), where a group of filmmakers from the two countries use cinema to make joint productions to help facilitate reconciliation and peace building. [2]

The projects implemented by DVV International (the Institute for International Cooperation of German Adult Education Association) and its partners between 2009 and 2016 are particularly important from the perspective of issues interesting for the DisTerrMem project.[3] These projects were aimed at building bridges between the people of Armenia and Turkey through adult education, exchange visits, journalism, oral history and art. The projects resulted in several books, including 'Speaking to One Another: Personal Memories of the Past from Armenia and Turkey' (Neyzi, Kharatyan & Simonyan, 2010; 'Prospects for Reconciliation: Theory and Practice' (Kharatyan-Araqelyan and Leyla Neyzi, 2011), 'Moush Sweet Moush: Mapping Memories from Armenia and Turkey' (Kharatyan et al., 2013). During these projects, student groups from Armenia and Turkey had an opportunity of speaking to each other, reflection, dialogue and revising the conflict narratives through joint work.

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[2] See www.armenia-turkey.net; http://www.cinemaplatform.org/intro.aspx; http://www.c-r.org/featured-work/memories-without-borders)

[3] More information on these projects can be found at: http://www.dvv-international.ge/armenia/projects/armenian-turkish-reconciliation-projects/.

The borders between Armenia and Turkey are still closed, the Genocide is still denied in Turkey, and the effectiveness of civic initiatives at this phase is important from the perspective of creating platforms for face-to-face meetings and conversations, which surely will have an impact, if political processes re-activate.

Similar to other post-conflict societies, in Armenia civil society organizations are mostly involved in capacity building, reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives, with local and international support. Often, the main issues of such dialogue projects and initiatives related to conflicting memories, remain their polarization from general public moods, their narrow beneficiary base, and still a low level of mutual trust.

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DIASPORA, CIVIL SOCEITY AND CONFLICT - Arsen Hakobyan

Arsen Hakobyan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography (National Academy of Science, Armenia). Arsen's previous research explores topics concerning the anthropology of violence, ethnicity and memory and diaspora groups. Below Arsen discusses Diaspora as civil society actors and their role in transnational activism. In conclusion, this review highlights the need to go beyond a simplistic and oppositional depiction of Diaspora as 'peace-makers' / 'peace spoilers' in order to understand the multifaced role they play in peace building efforts.

Conceptualising Diaspora and the role of memory

The usage of the term 'Diaspora' often carries the connotation of forced resettlement, due to expulsion, racism, or war, especially during ethno-nationalist conflicts. Meanwhile, Brubaker notes that the use of the term 'Diaspora' has been widening. According to him, an element of this expansion 'involves the application of the term diaspora to an ever-broadening set of cases: essentially to any and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed in space' (Brubaker 2005).

This paper discusses the interaction between Diaspora, civil society and memory/conflict. How do Diaspora became a civil society actor? What is the role of Diaspora as a political actor in the context of conflicts, and what is the role of memory in this process?

William Safran suggests six criteria to distinguish diasporas from migrant communities. According to his definition, the concept of Diaspora should be applied to expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the following characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original 'center' to two or more 'peripheral,' or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe that they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated

and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return—when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship (Safran 1991). Most authors mention three main Diaspora features: (a) scattering in at least two directions; (b) connection between the real and imaginary homeland; and (c) awareness of Diaspora identity that unites compatriots living in different countries (Butler 2001).

The concept of 'homeland' includes the following markers: the group maintains a myth or collective memory of their homeland; regards their ancestral homeland as their true home, to which they will eventually return; being committed to the restoration or maintenance of that homeland; and the members of group relate 'personally or vicariously' to the homeland to a point where it shapes their identity. (Brubaker 2005, p. 5. Weinar 2010, p. 75. Cohen 2008).

Brubaker introduced a new concept of Diaspora- the 'accidental Diaspora'. He connects the emergence of such Diasporas with the disintegration of large state formations, leading to a change in political borders. The main idea put by Brubaker as the basis for identifying 'accidental Diasporas' is not the movement of people across borders, but the movement of the borders themselves. 'Accidental Diasporas,' in contrast to already known historical or labor diasporas, arise instantly, as a result of a sharp change in the political system, contrary to the wishes of people. They are more compact than labor diasporas, which tend to be scattered in space and weakly rooted in host countries (Brubaker 2000).

According to Tölölyan, Diaspora is the paradigmatic Other of the nation-state, who have been the ally, lobby, or even the precursor of the nation-state (Israel), the source of ideological, political, or financial support for national movements (Palestinian), or the source of new ideas, new money, and new languages for the newly independent homelands (Armenia, Lithuania) (Tölölyan 2007).

Researchers have identified different types of Diasporas and are attempting to classify them. Cohen identifies the following types of diasporas: victim diasporas (Jewish, African, Armenian, Palestinian), labor diasporas (Indian), trade and business (Chinese, Lebanese), cultural and imperial (British, French, Spanish, Portuguese) diasporas (Cohen 2008).

Sheffer distinguishes the following types of diasporas: Diasporas with deep historical roots (this includes Armenian, Jewish and Chinese); 'dormant' diasporas (Americans in Europe and Asia and Scandinavians in the USA); 'young' diasporas (they are formed by Greeks, Poles and Turks); 'nascent,' that is, only at the initial stage of their formation (they are just beginning to form Koreans, Filipinos, as well as Russians in the former Soviet republics); 'homeless,' that is, without a 'home' state (diasporas of Kurds, Palestinians and Gypsies fall into this category). 'Ethno-national' is the most common type of diaspora. Their characteristic feature is that they feel behind the back the invisible presence of 'their' state; diasporas 'scattered' and diasporas living compactly. (Sheffer, 2003, 165).

Diaspora, trauma and memory

Armenian Diaspora is affected by the Armenian Genocide and the passing of trauma from one generation to the next (Cohen 2008). In this case, it is the Armenian Genocide of the early 20th century, which has led to the formation of a large part of the diaspora and still plays an important role in the Armenian identity (Cohen 2008).

As Assmann and Shortt mention, 'Memory is not only susceptible to changes, it is itself a powerful agent of change. Accredited with the power of transforming our relationship to the past and the ability to revise former values and attitudes, memory can create new frames of action. By working through past hatreds and resentments, memory can contribute towards reconciliation and new forms of co-existence, opening up the possibility of a common future. A mere change of regime cannot in and of itself usher in a new social contract. In order to achieve reconciliation and social integration, the often oppositional generational and cultural memories also need to be respected, and/or adapted and/or contained' (Asmann, Shortt, 2012).

In the context of the 'traumatic memory' or 'victim Diaspora,' the collective memory could get a political dimension and become part of national political ideology and political agenda, even at the international level. One example from the Armenian Diaspora, is the politicisation of the 1915 Genocide from the mid-1960s onwards. In 1965, on the 50th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, thousands of Armenians gathered in Yerevan (Soviet Armenia) and across Diaspora communities, demanding global recognition of and remembrance of the Armenian Genocide after fifty years of silence. It was the first step in the struggle for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915. While the taboos on the Armenians Genocide imposed by the Soviets started changing in 1965, 1965 also became the main axis for the post Genocide Diaspora, formulating new identity and discursive political practices.

Regarding the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, Hovannisian emphasizes that 1965 was a turning point for the revival of political activism in the Armenian Diaspora. As he mentions, 'it was not until 1965 that the politically fragmented Armenian diaspora drew together sufficiently for a united commemoration' and only after 1965 the Armenians began to externalize their concerns in a politically more organized way' (Hovannisian, 1994).

Tölölyan also mentions the changes that affected the transformation of the worldwide Armenian community into a diasporic socio-economic and political network after 1965. The changes at different levels of the Armenian community's concerns and worldwide relationships following 1965 events, brought about new dynamics leading to the emergence of an inclusive political sphere for the Armenian communities. These changes played an important role in the politicization of Armenians around the world within the context of redefined patterns and discourses in the community. Shifts at the discursive level created necessary grounds for emergence, consolidation and politicization of Armenian diasporic identity (Tölölyan 2000).

The issue of returning to the homeland is an important marker of identity for Diaspora. As Baser and Swan note, 'The idea of a potential return affords them a legitimate stake in the way they interfere with homeland policies. The notion of a 'secure homeland,' a place to return in time, plays a very important role in diaspora behavior, yet it has been proven by various cases that diaspora members are reluctant to leave the hostland when it comes to returning home if their goals are somehow achieved' (Baser and Swan 2009, 49).

Transnational diasporic activism

Sheffer draws attention to the urgency of the problems associated with the transnational nature of modern Diasporas. He notes that diasporas are increasingly influencing the situation in their places of residence, as well as reaching the regional and international level of decision-making in all parts of the planet. At the same time, in this sphere of scientific research, according to Sheffer, there are still many white spots, and one of them is the political aspects of the functioning of the diasporas, the trans-state networks and communication systems created by them that cross the borders of letting and receiving societies, as well as political weight and political loyalty of diasporal collectives (Sheffer 2003, p. 166-167). Trans-state networks include a variety of contacts and links established by social groups, political

structures and economic institutions across state borders. Sheffer believes that the ability to create cross-border networks stems from the essence of ethnonational diasporas, and the structure of these relations is very complicated and confusing. It is not possible to fully control the resources and information flowing through these trans-state networks. However, if the authorities in receiving and sending countries are not able to control these flows, they may be suspicious of lack of loyalty on the part of the Diaspora, and this, in turn, may provoke political and diplomatic confrontation between diasporas and their homelands, on one hand, and host states, on the other.

Tölölyan (2000) examines the Armenian diaspora's shift from exilic nationalism to diasporic transnationalism and mentions that 'the process of transition in the Armenian diaspora process is not synchronized. It began at different times and proceeds at different speeds.' According to him, 'In the wake of the contemporary transformation, which is framed by and within globalization, the Armenian diaspora no longer consists of a series of exile communities, fragments of the nation awaiting real or even symbolic repatriation. Rather, diaspora is, and is regarded by an ever larger majority of its members and of its contentious leadership as a permanent phenomenon' (Tölölyan 2000). Tölölyan notes that the Armenian transnation now includes Diaspora, Armenian and Nagorno Karabakh Republic. (Tölölyan, 2000)

The public sphere is important for civil society in terms of the action of citizens organized informally and formally in voluntary groups. As Calhun (2011) mentions, the public sphere works by communication, combining cultural creativity, selective appropriation of tradition, and reasoned debate to inform its members and potentially influence state and other institutions. Public communication does not simply flow in an undifferentiated fashion. Whether at a national or a transnational level, public sphere is composed of multiple partially overlapping publics and counter publics. These bring forward different conceptions of the public good and sometimes of the larger, inclusive public itself.

The value of a public sphere rooted in civil society rests on three core claims: first, that there are matters of concern important to all citizens and to the organization of their lives together; second, that through dialogue, debate, and cultural creativity, citizens might identify good approaches to these matters of public concern; and third, that states and other powerful players might be organized to serve the collective interests of ordinary people—the public—rather than state power as such, purely traditional values, or the personal interests of rulers and elites. These claims have become central to modern thinking about democracy and about politics, culture, and society more generally (Calhoun, 2011).

Pnina Werbner uses the term 'diasporic public sphere' in reference to British Pakistani Muslims. She defines it as 'a space in which different transnational imaginaries are interpreted and argued over, where aesthetic and moral fables of diaspora are formulated, and political mobilization generated' (Werbner, 1998, 11). The diaspora dynamics takes place through encounters that physically unite people. That is why, Tölölyan argues, that in a Diaspora, as within nation-states, the reproduction of culture and of contesting visions of collective identity is a quotidian, persistent, and costly activity, conducted by larger groups of intellectuals, some of whom are associated with-or, in the case of most teachers, dependent upon-organizations and institutions that offer material support and make ideological claims. These institutions constitute a diasporic civil society that nurtures and sustains the public sphere of debate and cultural production (Tölölyan, 2000, 109).

In the contexts where diaspora is seen as a soft power and a political actor, special emphasis is being placed on diasporic networks, through which expatriates often advocate the cultural and civic attractiveness of their home country and spread its soft power over the host society (Blarel 2012; Nye 2004, 2011; Watanabe 2008).

Ishkanyan analyzes the impact of transnational diasporic activism on Armenia, and situates this discussion within the discussions of globalization and global civil society (Ishkanyan, 2005). Cocherane discuses interconnection between the Diaspora, civil society and peace building and argues that 'Diaspora groups are clearly constituent elements of civil society and such people often take an interest in conflict and peace building efforts within their countries of birth. The argument here is that Diaspora groups are a central component of civil society and should be included in any analysis of its contribution to peace building' (Cocherane 2007).

According to Bercovitch, diasporas play a role in politics on four levels: 'the domestic level in a host country; the regional level; the trans-state level; and the level of the entire dispersed group in other countries' (Bercovitch 2007, 21). On each of these levels, the diaspora can be either maintaining, defending or promoting its interests.

Diaspora, conflict and peace building

The role of Diaspora is discussed in the context of conflict, peace and resolution (Baser and Swan 2009; Koinova 2009; Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009; Shain 2002 etc.). However, despite 'the diaspora – peace – conflict nexus has developed into an area of key research interest, particularly within conflict - and diaspora studies, this is an emerging field of study, but one which remains largely underdeveloped' (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009, 5). In the practical level, as Tölölyan mentions: 'As yet, neither scholars, nor the international community, nor diasporas have sufficient experience of how to cooperate in resolving conflicts involving homelands' (Tölölyan, 2006).

The focus has often been on diaspora as 'peacemaker' or 'peace spoiler.' Pirkkalainen and Abdile note a third category of the role of diasporas in conflict. The related literature notices, that the debate on diaspora and conflict can be divided into three categories. First, migrants or diasporas can be perceived as agents for promoting peace and development. The second and opposing conceptualization is

that these two groups can have a negative or even destructive impact. The third argument is that they can simultaneously be 'peace-makers' and 'peacebreakers' (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009, 5).

The volume edited by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares defined a debate, seeking to understand whether diasporas are 'peace-makers or peace-wreckers' when relating to original homelands experiencing conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. The volume sought to challenge simplistic notions that diasporas are either moderate or radical actors, and brought empirical evidence that they can be both. (Smith, Stares, 2007)

Tölölyan discusses the role of Armenian Diaspora and Armenia in the context of conflict resolution posing a question-'History and Geography?' and analyzes similarities and differences in State (Armenia) and Diaspora attitudes towards Armenian-Turkish relations, Nagorno Karabakh conflict and related security issues (Tölölyan, 2006).

Due to globalization, as well as an increased number of ethnic conflicts, diasporas have become important political actors that can be very influential, given their increased ties with the homeland (Smith and Stares 2007, 21). Because these links have broaden, the ability of diasporas to influence conflicts in their homeland have also improved.

On the other hand, Koniova distinguishes four types of Diaspora political mobilization—radical (strong and weak) and moderate (strong and weak), and argues that dynamics in the original homeland drives the overall trend towards radicalism or moderation of a diaspora mobilization in a host-land (Koniova, 2013).

The role of diasporas in different types of reconciliation is very complicated. Young and Park describe the case of the Liberian Diaspora and their role in the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project (2009). This was the first of its kind that included a Diaspora population (Young and Park 2009, 341). Young and Park even argue in their article that there might be possible legal obligations in involving Diaspora in the reconciliation process as victims – and especially important for what is termed 'victim Diaspora.' (Young and Park 2009, 349). The memory can be a part of the reconciliation process because the memory can play a key role in processes of change and transition. Through a cosmopolitan lens, Andreas Huyssen draws attention to memory's positive role in the processes of change, noting: 'In the best practice scenario, the cultures of memory are intimately linked, in many parts of the world, to processes of democratization and struggles for human rights, to the expansion and strengthening of the public spheres of civil society. (Huyssen, 2000, 36). DisTerrMem provides an opportunity to explore the how the memory of conflict and trauma shapes, and is shaped by, Diaspora. An agonistic approach in the context of disputed territories can also help to break down the simplistic oppositional roles of 'peace-makers' / 'peace spoilers' to demonstrate the complex and multifaceted role of Diaspora in peacebuilding efforts.

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CIVIL SOCIETY, THE STATE AND POLITICS OF MEMORY: REMEMBRANCE, RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE - Muhammad Younis

Dr. Muhammad Younis (Associate Professor, Forman Christian College) has research interests which include federalism, democracy, the politics of Pakistan and International Organizations. This section discusses various transnational patterns related to memory and reconciliation and the emergence of truth commissions to address the legacy of conflict.

The 20th century saw a rise in attempts by civil society towards memory reconciliation at a transnational level, especially in the field of transitional justice. Originally the term transitional justice was used in legal context, however, it soon became apparent that it could also be used for non-judicial instruments such as healing circles, apologies, collective remembrance and commemoration. All of this became evident with the establishment of organizations like Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (Schwelling, 2012, 4). All of these organizations have aimed to dig out and convey past injustices that have occurred. With the codification of the principles upon which these organizations work, it seems that transitional justice practices have been affirmed at an international level. However, a closer examination reveals that uncovering these past injustices can be problematic for societies unwilling to confront their past. For example, it took the U.S. a long time to accept its atrocities towards the indigenous people through slavery. The same is the case with Australia (Schwelling, 2012, 5).

A denial or hesitation towards memory of injustice is not unique to any part of the world. In Poland, the birthplace of the Solidarity Movement was a shipyard. But when it went near to closure and as an iconic Polish site made headlines, it went largely unnoticed in Poland (Pearce, 2009, 3). This ironic development was explained as a consequence of hesitation on part of the Poland to reconcile with its past. Although Polish people do organize commemorations, the feuding Solidarity activists have discouraged people and in general they seem oblivious to their past. However,

while all of these concerns are valid, it must be taken into account that this is not a matter of outright denial of Poland's Solidarity Movement, but rather an aloofness from it. In fact, residents of Plonsk, Poland walk every October along the roads where Jews were made to walk before being sent off to Aushwitz (Holc, 2018). Vigils are held to commemorate the innocent lives lost. This is an example of memory activism, and it seeks remembrance of past injustice. One problem that Holc has tried to address through memory activism is the silence of Poles during the Holocaust. Among other arguments, it is stated that the Poles were made to rationalize anti-Semitism. Much of this work was done by the Center for Jewish Culture in Krakow (Holc, 2018, 82). Although the argument is compelling, rationalization of anti-Semitism could not have been propagated to all Poles. This kind of critical investigation does open ways to accurate reconciliation between Jew and non-Jew Polish population.

Over the years, in different parts of the world, a lot of methods have been used to investigate the process of transitional memory, reconciliation and the role of civil society in it. Cases of injustice from the 20th century onwards were taken; studied and civil society's involvement was investigated. Finally, the practical implications of reconciliation processes were also taken into account. For some, it was argued that reconciliation is a utopian idea and cannot be fully achieved (Schwelling, 2012). Interestingly, this is in contrast to the author's aims towards proper reconciliation. Regardless, the approach does help look at the reconciliation process in the 20th Century. Japan spent the second half of the 20th Century in re-building its economy and infrastructure. But with all of its economic boom and progress, Japan has been unable to do away with its colonial injustices, something China and Korea are unwilling to forget. This has become a roadblock in Japan's ambitions of playing a substantive role in regional politics. Therefore, it is important for China, South Korea and Japan to work together in order to address the trust deficit that has historically occurred between these nations. (Goto, 2015). However, there is a need to address the domestic realities of each of these nations when it comes to reconciliation and

the consequences of steps taken towards them. While the suggestion to form dialogue between these nations to speed up reconciliation can be effective in the long term, Japan's short term regional dominance may still remain contested. And Japan's guilt-fatigue is not helping it so far.

Acknowledgement of past injustices can help bridge gaps and foster reconciliation. An example of this can be taken from the Armenian genocide. When Talaat Pasha, the man held responsible for this was killed by an Armenian rebel, the jury surprisingly came in favour of the Armenian (Payne, 2012, 45). This was very unpredictable because the case turned from a clear murder case to an acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide. The trial even investigated the German inaction during the genocide and found no immediate links. Since it gave the Armenians the recognition they had been calling for, the trial proved political and helped Germany reconcile with the Armenians. Although this meant a distance from its World War I ally, it also meant that any German complicity in this genocide would now seem oxymoronic. However, the same Germany that investigated the genocide of the 1910s and distanced itself from it was directly responsible for another and even more horrific genocide three decades later. Regardless, in the post-war period, many Germans have made efforts to reconcile with their past atrocities through atonement due to the guilt faced by them. A large part of this narrative taken to task by German youth, who tried to play their part in reconciling with the Israelis by coming to terms with the realities of their past injustices. In fact, this guilt was particularly more visible in the German youth in the 1960s. The German youth became particularly vocal in its activism towards reconciliation by promoting the idea of peace through the process of atonement and playing its part in the Israeli-Palestine conflict (Wienand, 2012). Furthermore, it was seen that this activism was not limited to German youth of 1960s or 1970s but kept renewing with each generation. Hence, this can be seen as a continued practice of reconciliation by the Germans in their effort towards achieving atonement. This can be seen in parallel to the efforts of Japan in the post-war period reconciliation (Goto, 2015). However,

much like Japan, Germany can also get a guilt-fatigue. So, while it is vital for Germany to keep reconciliation constant, it should take into account that it can become a hindrance in the same way it has become for Japan. Similarly, it is very important to keep past injustices from getting politicized to an extent where they may be used for political gains instead of reconciliation. An example of this was seen in 2005, when in an effort to promote peace, a few thousand Jewish settlers were removed from Gaza strip (Langenbacher, n.d.). The plan resulted in widespread backlash from ultra-nationalist Israeli outfits and the Prime Minister of Israel resigned as the finance minister. But the most intriguing aspect was the comparison that was drawn between this plan and the Jewish resettlement during the Holocaust. It was widely propagated that these actions were not different from those horrific injustices of Nazi Germany. Although symbolism of Nazi Germany was widely used to revert this plan, but when the actual withdrawal happened, it proved to be much more peaceful and orderly. Hence, it can be seen that it is vital to look at both sides of the story before drawing conclusions and drawing similarities between events of monumental value. The excessive usage of the horrors of Holocaust to draw parallels with a peace effort shows the volatility of such narratives. It must be understood that every narrative, whether inclusive or exclusive is based on an argument that resonates with its supporters.

This pursuit of truth has led to the formation and global diffusion of Truth Commissions. Truth Commissions have become popular in places undergoing a transition from a dictatorship towards a democracy. Although the phenomenon of Truth Commissions was unheard of half a century ago, it has become widely popular in digging up and confronting past injustices. Through these Commissions, the reconciliation becomes more likely. Since the 1980s, Truth Commissions have been set up with similar goals of uncovering the human rights violations in the period of turmoil and repression under different regimes (Kruger, 2012). As a consequence of their popularity, truth commissions have been established by NGOs at national as well as international level. The reports of these commissions are widely accepted as

providing an image of the past injustices. There is also danger of outside influence on these commissions, especially if they are constituted at a governmental level. Regardless, the global spread of these commissions do provide for a wide range of data which can be compared and result in a globally accepted truth. This can pave the way towards reconciliation through collaborations. In fact, collaborations have been used as a tool of reconciliation at global level. As discussed above, memory narratives can be localized and in turn be politicized. In order to counter this, cross-border collaborations are done so that different memory narrative can be heard. One example of this is the post-war memory narratives formed in Europe; a continent ravaged with a long history of conflicting ideologies, enmities, wars and memory narratives. The European Union has played a huge role in developing a negotiated memory narrative that can suit such a diverse and divided continent. This has led to a number of resolutions and declarations which have formed guidelines and rules for development of memory narratives by 'memory entrepreneurs' (Jones 2017). These are people who collaborate across borders to reveal memory details of past events. Their role has been central to the spreading of cosmopolitan memory practices based around a universal focus of suffering and a shared human condition (Bull and Hansen, 2015).

As a result of their work, memory initiatives like the IHRA, ENRS and ENOA have focused on reconciliation between nations and show a united solidarity with victims of past injustice (Jones 2017, 29). This movement of memory narratives beyond borders is aimed to prevent the territorializing of memories and preserve an 'accepted truth', or 'negotiated' memory. This has been seen as central to unify an otherwise divided Europe. However, in a blow to the negotiated memory project, this decade has seen the rise of antagonistic neo-nationalism throughout Europe. Unlike the former, the rise of antagonistic neo-nationalism has promoted the extreme right's nationalistic narrative. This discourse is localized and territorial unlike the cosmopolitan abstract form. It is proposed that these two modes of remembrance can be linked by undertaking an agonistic approach towards

remembrance (Bull and Hansen, 2015). According to this form of remembrance, the cosmopolitan form of remembrance has favored collective memory over the socio-political passions that led to the formation of such memories. Hence, agonistic form of remembrance relies on a number of socio-political perspectives to bring light to historical events. Hence, it gives importance to collective and individual perspectives. The aim is to compliment cosmopolitan viewpoint in some cases. However, the effectiveness of agonistic form of remembrance is still to be seen in an era when antagonism is on the rise.

The problem with pursuing a certain narrative of remembrance is that it clouds the realities by forming revisionist narratives. This can blur the realities of the struggles against past injustices. At the reunion of Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, Joyce Ladner expressed disappointment with the way historical context seemed to inaccurately portray the realities of history (Nasstrom, 2008, 325). The lack of depiction of personal narratives of those involved in civil rights movement seemed unfair to him. By forming a collective form of remembrance, the unpleasant realities of such memories can be overlooked. He promoted the usage of autobiographies in memoir formation. The aim of these autobiographies of civil rights movements and their history is to provide a wider and diverse data for the remembrance of history. While this can give rise to a lot of ambiguity and disagreement, it can help in understanding the grand narrative and make it more binding and convincing.

It can also make combating re-emergence of past injustices easier. In a conference held in University of Pennsylvania in 1995, the trauma of sexual abuse memory and the law around it was discussed (Elliot, 1996). It was found that much of the repressed memories of child sexual abuse are a result of incest. And unfortunately, much of this was not taken seriously. In fact, it was not until 1993, that a law was re-written in the State of Virginia, that sexual abuse victims were able to sue their parents (Elliot, 1996, 15). The ignorance of this injustice can be explained by the

private nature of the crime and the absence of safeguards against it. The taboo nature of this memory caused its repression by the victims. It was not until this discussion was normalized and sexual abuse victims started speaking out, that this issue was taken seriously. The repression of these memories slowed the process of memory reconciliation. This speaks volumes of the importance of memory and remembrance in dealing with past traumas. Issues like these reveal the shortcomings of civil society in modern democracies. Hence, there is a need to put light on the responsibilities of civil society.

According to Flyvbjerg (2012), the philosophy of Habermas' communicative rationality in a progressive democracy, backed by consensus, can enable a better functioning civil society. In contrast, Foucault promoted the acceptance of conflicts in democracies. He argued that perfect consensus is unachievable and in a civil society centered on power analytic conflicts will happen. Both of these arguments reflect the different shades of a democracy and can play their part in memory reconciliation.

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DIASPORA, MEMORY AND THE NATION STATE - Syed Shah

In this section Syed Shah (PhD candidate, University of Bath) continues to discuss the role of memory for diaspora communities and connects this with examples across different nation states. Syed argues that alongside the economic, political and social ties that continue to be encouraged between the 'homeland' and diaspora, memory is central to this process.

The analysis of the past is crucial for our understanding of events affecting the relationship between nation-states and civil society. Memories shapes cultures and cultures shape human behaviour. As states are composed of individuals, they depict the very character of the inhabitants. One such group of inhabitants are diaspora, who cross the physical boundaries of the nation state but remain firmly rooted through memories. Memories can therefore construct a strong unseen bridge that emotionally connects the diasporas to their 'homeland'.

The Diasporas according to Lehneman is 'a group that recognizes its separateness based on common ethnicity/nationality, lives in a host country, and maintains some kind of attachment to the home country' (Lahneman 2005, p. 7). Diasporas include migrants, refugees, exiles, ethnic and minority groups (Safran 1991, p. 83). Traditionally the term 'Diaspora' has been used predominantly for Jewish migrants across the globe. However, the term has been broadened to include groups living outside their homeland. Brubaker disagrees with the broadening of the term as it blur the meaning and even diffuses the term (Brubaker 2005). Despite this lack of consensus the subject matter of analysis remains an individual uprooted by certain circumstances. This literature review, explores the literature concerning diaspora communities and their relationships to the two states, the state they left behind (the 'homeland) and the state they reside in (the 'host states').

Social, political and economic connections

Our understanding starts with observing the incorporation of diasporas into host states. These incorporations can be social, economic and political. The social incorporation of diasporas into the state takes different forms. States may claim diaspora descent, or linguistic and cultural affinity (McIntyre and Gamlen 2019, p. 38). Whatever form or shape it takes, the fact remains that the social impact of migration on diaspora and states remains considerable. Levit (1998) termed these social and cultural imprints as 'social remittances'. He defined these transactions as 'the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending countries' (Levitt 1998, p. 927). These influences can range from cultural habits to political ideas and practices. For example, the South American migrants in the USA influence culture in their origin countries in subtle ways. The gifts and pictures sent back transform the culture of the 'homeland' as 'nonemigrants observed these styles when migrants also received clothing as gifts. Because young women, emulate these patterns, they combined elements of items from the United States and created a new hybrid style' (Levitt 1998, p. 932). The flow of culture is never one sided as the sending country also impact the receiving country in many ways. Sometimes these influences are unintentional while at other times sending states actively pursue cultural influences (McIntyre and Gamlen 2019, p. 38).

The political incorporation of diaspora into states is multidimensional. The first factor to consider is the body politic of the host state itself. In 'civic' or liberal countries the diasporas are assimilated on the condition that they abide by the laws of the state. However, countries with nationalistic or closed outlook tends to discourage diaspora assimilation (McIntyre and Gamlen 2019, p. 38). Secondly, the political landscape of the sending nation also shapes diaspora politics. For example, states with closed political systems tends to demonise diasporas that have left the 'homeland'. This was evident in the case of the Ceausescu regime (1965-1989) who declared all Romanian diasporas as enemies (McIntyre and Gamlen 2019, p. 39). These

assimilations produce outcomes affecting the host states, origin states and the diasporas.

Firstly, the host state influences the sending state politically in indirect ways. For example, experiences concerning different democratic processes in a host-nation makes the possibilities of individual freedoms and ease of access to resources/services becomes a realisable possibility. These stirrings may create momentum and demand for reformed political processes and rights at home (Levitt 1998, p. 942). Secondly, the host states also utilize diaspora to influence events in the 'home-land'. The use of diaspora for political ends can be observed in the case of Turkey using its diaspora in Europe to build a softer image post 2001. Adamson (2019, p. 224) argues these measures were initiated in order to increase Turkey's chances of advancing the process of EU membership. Diasporas often carry powerful memories and emotional attachments to their 'homeland'. Two events in recent Turkish history demonstrate the strong influence of diaspora on the politics of the 'homeland'. The Turkish constitutional referendum of 2017 and the parliamentary elections of 2015 observed high levels of political participation by the Turkish diasporas (Adamson 2019, p. 211), who are described as having responded emotionally to the memories of old conflicts and 'pressure their home governments to adopt more nationalist and assertive policies towards neighbouring countries' (Ibid, p. 39).

For host-states, diaspora communities can provide a source of financial investment and 'form diaspora policies that attempt to realize the actual (or potential) financial, strategic, political, or security value of the diaspora' (McIntyre and Gamlen 2019, p. 37). The receiving states have traditionally used diasporas for economic benefits due to their 'special skills' which has been encouraged historically through economic migration.

Today states are tapping into the economic benefits of their diasporas to provide a source of revenue and investment. These revenue streams can be investments,

tourism and regular visits to the 'homeland' (Lowell and Gerova 2004, p. 3). The case of Indian policies to attract diasporas resulted in an amendment to the law in 2003 which allows the diaspora to travel, invest and operate business in India without restrictions (Dickinson and Bailey 2007, p. 771). South Asian countries in general are tapping into the vast number of diasporas. In India and Pakistan, financial instruments are created for the sole purpose of attracting diaspora's wealth. Interest rates on foreign currency accounts are kept lucrative and bonds of varying attractive denominations are offered to diaspora (Lowell and Gerova 2004, p. 14).

In the case of Pakistan, diaspora remittances have played a decisive role in boosting the country's fragile economy (Roger Ballard 2007, p. 44). Remittances makes 6% of Pakistan's GDP and reached US $18.4 billion in 2015 (Erdal 2016, p. 5). Pakistan thus is making sure to benefits from uninterrupted flow of diaspora income. To meet this objective, Pakistan has established a dedicated ministry for the diaspora's affairs. Pakistan also has dual citizenship agreements with countries where there is significant diasporas concentration. Pakistan even offers special status to individuals with Pakistani ancestry to attract their investments (ibid.). Pakistan is not alone, as many diaspora populations support the 'homeland' by supplying 'expertise, military recruits, and on occasion political leadership to the homeland' (Adamson 2019, p. 39).

Diaspora, memory and the state

Our exploration of memory continues with the role of the nation state in diaspora recollections of the past. Nation states play an important role in the shaping and reshaping of memories. The role of different states has been contradictory in this respect. Some states, such as Vietnam, tried to reshape or erase memories of past atrocities committed by the state on its citizens. On the contrary, other nation states have established museums and other institutions to celebrate migrants and their histories (Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013, p. 691). This section further explores

the literature that deals with the different memory modes used by nation states and goes on to discuss how diaspora frame their memory of the 'homeland'.

States have used antagonistic memories against diasporas in the past and continue to do so in the present; Pakistan provides one example of this. In state building narratives, the plight of religious minorities called 'Ahmadis' are often used to represent an 'other' to Pakistani identity. The 'Ahmadis' are a sub-sect within Islam. They challenge the concept of finality of prophethood, which remains the cornerstone of mainstream Islam. These ideological differences resulted in backlash from the hardline elements of society against 'Ahmadis'. Riots against Ahmadis (1953 and 1974) resulted in the murder of hundreds of Ahmadis Muslims. Finally, under pressure from the religious parties, the Ahmadi sect was declared un-Islamic. These discriminations led to the migration of millions of Ahmadis abroad. The official designations of being Un-Islamic in a conservative religious country had serious repercussions for the Ahmadis as they were now systematically discriminated (Qadir, 2015, p.165). The report published by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour in 2002 pointed to discrimination by the state against the Ahmadi community through the application of harsh 'Blasphemy Laws' and severe restrictions on their religious beliefs and practices as well surveillance of the community by the state (BoD 2002).

From a different perspective, New Zealand's approach to addressing the past is an interesting example of agonistic memory practices. Historically, the approach of the New Zealand government towards its citizens migrating to Australia was to portray them as unpatriotic. However, in the last decade, Gamelan has described New Zealand's approach to its diaspora as a transnational resource; 'the government's later embracing attitude towards expatriates should be seen as part of a new process of 'roll out' neoliberal reforms, driven by a 'Third Way' philosophy of strategic partnering between states and markets. In this new environment, political and business leaders sought new ways to optimise the performance of markets through

state actions to suppress 'market failures' and support 'positive externalities. Engaging skilled expatriates' strategic locations was seized upon as a creative way of amplifying one of emigration's positive side effects - namely expatriates' transnational contributions - and using these to counteract the feared market failure of 'brain drain'.' (Gamlen 2013, p. 239)

Diaspora communities identify themselves with their cultures and countries of origins where emotional attachment often remains strong to the events unfolding in the 'homeland'; memory plays an important role in this process (Lahneman 2005, p. 7). The nature of association may vary but the emotional intensity of memories attached to the homeland remain strong (Armstrong 1976, p. 395). The following phrases cited by Safran, depict the emotional attachment of communities to their countries of origin,

> Jeszcze Polska nie zginiela kiedy my zyjemy'(Poland Is Not Yet Lost *while we live*)—these are still the words of the Polish national anthem, which parallel those of 'Hatikva,' the Zionist and, later, Israeli national anthem: 'As long as there is a Jewish soul within us… our eyes turn to Zion. (Safran 1991, p. 97)

The Pakistani community living in United Kingdom maintains a strong emotional connection to the 'homeland'. One example of this memory attachment is the association of business names with the towns and cities they came from. For instance, the 'Kashmir' is frequently used for naming restaurants and stores etc. In the case of Pakistani Kashmiri community 'Memories of a homeland are also evoked with the sending of *Eid* cards bearing pictures of martyred Kashmiris, freedom slogans, well-respected freedom fighters like Maqbool Butt, or the Kashmir flag' (Ali 2003, p. 475).

The memories of identity that most diaspora groups adhere to are described by Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh as being 'intrinsically selective and exclude events deemed as inappropriate or potentially destabilizing. As such, they are often reprocessed into a more or less coherent and 'truthful' story that legitimates a socially tailored image of the community. In doing so, collective memories redraw

the boundaries between sameness and otherness, between the self and the other, by both including or excluding and by establishing hierarchies between social groups' (2013, p. 685). Once the differentiation is made, then these memories can be used by the diaspora to gain political advantage by identifying themselves as the victims or underdogs (Ibid).

Fair (2005) highlights the use of antagonistic memory by the Sikh community in supporting separatist movements in India. The 'Khalistan' movement was an independence movement for the establishment of a Sikh homeland in the 1990s. The Sikh religious temples across the world were used by the Sikh diaspora to reinvigorate antagonistic memories from Sikh history as well as collecting funds for the independence movement. Visible reminders of the memories were displayed in these temples which portrayed the 'martyrs' from the Punjab conflict. They were often 'placed alongside depictions of historical martyrs from the annals of Sikh history'. According to Fair, this visually established 'a seamless line of Sikh oppression stemming from the 17th century to the modern period' (Fair 2005, p. 132) .

Bhimji's (2008) research on British women of South Asian origin highlights how feelings of attachment to the 'homeland' despite differences in culture can result in mixed emotional responses to the two societies they attached memories to. On the one hand, they had some connection to the 'homeland' and on the other they were strongly bonded with Britain. One of the individuals being interviewd by the author describes, 'I like having lots and lots of family. And it's really funny when I go to Pakistan, I feel like I've gone home. Even though I feel this is my home here. When I go to Pakistan, I feel a different feeling of home coming. I feel very relaxed there. I love the weather um. I don't know – I just – I know people go on and on about how many faults there are, and I don't pretend that there aren't faults. I love the one main thing about Pakistan is that no matter what part of Pakistan you go to family is

much important thing. It is still the building block of the world to them.' (Bhimji 2008, p. 417).

Some researchers have identified a cosmopolitan frame used by diaspora groups in order to appeal to universalistic principles and dominant discourses of equality, emancipation and freedom of speech to have ethnic or religious education rights for their children in schools. Giving the example of Muslim diasporas in western countries Soysal (2000) argues that diaspora 'forward demands about mother-tongue instruction, Islamic *foulard*, or *halal* food by asserting the 'natural' right of individuals to their own cultures, rather than drawing upon religious teachings and traditions' (Soysal 2000, p. 7). Cohen is critical of this cosmopolitan framing by stating that 'many diasporas want to have their cake and eat it.' He goes on to argue 'They want not only the security and opportunities available in their countries of settlement, but also a continuing relationship with their country of origin and co-ethnic members in other countries' (Cohen 1996, p. 518). These debates highlight a disjuncture, or antagonism, that exists in what are framed as incompatibilities between different cultural and ethnic groups.

Pakistani Diaspora in the UK

Antagonistic representations of memory 'privileges emotions in order to cement a strong sense of belonging to a particularistic community, focusing on the suffering inflicted by the 'evil' enemies upon this same community'. Cosmopolitan memories focus on a common humanity where atrocities committed are against the whole humanity by an evil that can be reformed through compassion. These responses do not resolve the underlying causes of tension or conflict (Bull and Hansen 2016, p. 398).

The case of Pakistani diaspora in Britain remains under explored in the context of memory attachment to the homeland and its impact on race relations. The words of one young British Pakistani describes this complex relationship when she states, 'My

parents want to show me my roots and I want to see my roots… Britain is their country, not our country. This feeling is always at the back of our head and the tables can turn at any time… It's like even though we have British passports and nationalities but still we are just Pakistanis and hence can be kicked out any day.' (Bolognani 2014, p. 108). Such sentiments have become more prominent in the post 911 environment yet little attention in the literature is paid to these trends among British Pakistanis and how memory shapes these feelings of (de)attachment. DisTerrMem provides an opportunity to further explore the dynamics between memory and identity through a case study of the British Pakistani community. Crucial to this understanding is to also question how other identities of class, gender, caste etc interact with feelings towards the 'homeland' and 'host nation' across such diaspora community.

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HOW CIVIL SOCIETY CAN CORRECT 'HISTORICAL MISTAKES' AND ORGANIZE A DIALOGUE: SOME CASE STUDIES FROM ARMENIA -Ani Lecrivain

Ani Lecrivain, from the NGO E&C Bridges, is a translator, legal expert and also works with young people through a variety of informal educational projects. This section continues the discussion on civil society by exploring the broad range of tactics used - from violence to lobbying governments - for international recognition. Ani also utilises her legal expertise to set out how future generations of Armenians have used the legal system to fight for reparations and reclaim lost land following the genocide.

Memory would be particularly important not to evoke mourning, but to avoid further mourning.

*Alfred GROSSER, **Crime and Memory***

The 21st century has been marked by several genocides. Historical studies show that, after the violence, the survivors from the Armenian genocide of 1915 dispersed into diaspora throughout the world (Tonybee 1916; Kévorian 2006; Chaliand, Ternon 2002; Toroyan, Nichanian 2013), especially in France, the United States, Lebanon and Syria. After the Ottoman Empire surrendered in 1918, its newly organized government, led by Ahmed Izzet Pasha, decided to try the leaders of the Young Turks and the members of the Union and Progress Committee (CUP) for involving the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and for having organized the massacre of the Armenians. The first verdict of 'trial of the Unionists' against the Young Turks was pronounced on July 5, 1919. Those condemned to death in absentia were: the Minister of the Interior Talaat Pasha, the Grand Vizier and the head of the CUP; the Minister of War Enver Pasha, the Minister of the Navy and the Commander of the 4th Turkish army in Syria during the First World War; the member of the Central Committee of Teshqilat Mahsuse, Djemal Pasha; and the Minister of National Education, Doctor Nazim. However, the sentences could not be implement as the accused had fled to Berlin, Rome and Tbilisi. This lead several Armenian avengers

(Salomon Teilirian, Arshavir Shirakian, Aram Erkanian, Petros Ter Boghossian, Artashes Gevordjian) to carry out the verdict of the trial and kill the leaders identified as responsible (Ternon, 1977).

Several studies exploring the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 are critical of its formation for being built on the mass displacement of Christians and other peoples of the Ottoman Empire (Del Valle 2001, Bruneau 2015) and on the appropriation of holdings and confiscated properties from Armenians, Assyrian-Chaldeans, Pontic Greeks, Jews and Syriacs (Poatel, Üngör 2012). To build a new nation-state and thus, a new history, it was essential to transform the framework, both temporal and spatial, of memory (Keroypyan 2015). The construction of the new Republican Turkey within Mustafa Kemal's government and ideology, required the revision of the country's past and the memory of war and genocide. This revision of the past is also argued to be accompanied by an attack on the memory of the space in which non-Turks lived (Üngör 2009). Thus, as several researchers note, the destruction of the Armenian patrimony continued throughout the 20th century (Mucci 2015).

The 'activation' of civil society

The entry of the term 'genocide' into the legal vocabulary in 1944 (Schabas, 2010; Irvin-Erickson, 2017), the Nuremberg trial and the parallels drawn between the genocides incurred by Armenians and Jews (Ternon, 2003) gave legitimacy to Armenians to openly speak about the violence in 1915 that had hitherto been called 'the great catastrophe' (Marian, 2015). Even more so, Stalin's colonial claims towards Turkey after World War II raised once again the 'Armenian question' and hope among Armenians to regain their lost land (Suny, 1993). In 1965, with the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide, when mass protests took place in Yerevan and across the diaspora, another major political claim appeared in civil society: the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide as

a means of compelling Turkey to acknowledge its crime and pay compensation for losses, but also the return of Armenian historical lands (Cheterian 2010).

In the 1970s, the problem of Armenian memory and the international recognition of the 1915 genocide took extreme forms in civil society, characterized by terrorist acts (Dugan 2009). The overlapping aims of the two main Armenian terrorist groups (ASALA and JCAAG) were to create an autonomous Armenian political entity in Turkey and to obtain retrospective recognition of the existence of genocide by the current Turkish government (Grosser 1989). Curiously, ASALA's 'advertising' terrorist campaign (Chaliand 1980) succeeded to mobilize a whole new generation of young Armenians, and in giving a new impetus to political mobilization within the diaspora (Cheterian 2010). Research published in the 1980s by researchers from outside Armenia, and the intensification of the work of Armenian activists, enabled more than twenty countries (such as most of Latin America, Canada, Russia, Lebanon, France, Greece and Italy) to recognize the 'great catastrophe' in 1915 as genocide (Chabot, Kasparian, Thiéraut, 2008; Masseret 2002). A key driver cited by civil society in campaigning for the wider international recognition of the genocide is to prevent its repetition (Duclert 2015). According to historian Ph. Videlier (2005), the fact that this memory has been given international acknowledgement has given Armenian society and the diaspora renewed purpose. Particularly in the US, the strong Armenian diaspora (through organisations such as the Armenian National Committee of America) had campaigned and lobbied the government since the 1960s to recognise the violence and the deportations in 1915 as genocide. Numerous researchers have also given much attention to the issue of recognition and the impact of economic, political and diplomatic factors (Zarifian 2013). Against the position of President Trump, by the end of 2019, both the US Senate and House of Representatives had voted in favor of recognising the Armenian genocide.

Future directions and campaigns

At present, Armenian civil society, including the diaspora, is divided on future actions to be taken. Some advocate the intensified continuation of the struggle for international political recognition of the genocide and the Republic of Armenia. This relies heavily on the role of diplomacy, but, according to the researchers, can hold unconvincing objectives from a strategic point of view in terms of strengthening prevention obligations.

Others focus on financial compensations requests (Collectif 2015, association Earth and Culture). The first individual or group claims for compensation were filed in the United States courts by the heirs of Armenians who had taken out life insurance policies before 1915 with American, French, German and English insurers on the territory of Ottoman Turkey. The New York Life insurance (Saltzman, Neuwirth, 2011) and Axa Insurance cases have led to arbitrations negotiated between insurance companies and claimants. It should be stressed that these cases did not involve directly the responsibility of the Turkish State.

Other cases, in particular Harry Arzoumanian and others (Demirdjian 2015), who argued for political recognition of the genocide by the State of California, saw the course of the proceedings thwarted by the US Federal Court. The decision of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal, confirmed by a decision of the United States Supreme Court in May 2013, argued that the judgment in favor of the applicants by the California courts was likely to affect US foreign policy and diplomatic relations between the US government and Turkey, and that in this case the US Executive's right of pre-emption on this case was justified.

The most recent initiatives for individual complaints have taken place in Turkey. These interesting cases to observe and follow take place in the domestic courts. They concern expropriation cases or confiscation of property. The applicants hold property titles (which is not the case for the vast majority of Armenians descended from victims or survivors of the genocide). Zvart Sudjian (an American citizen with

title deeds in the Diyarbakir region) is represented and defended by an Istanbul law firm (Theriault 2015). The basis of the claims are claims for restitution or compensation for confiscated property. The legal grounds raised are the protection of the right of ownership, respect for the right of access to cadastral archives, and the obligation of the Turkish State to control the identification of beneficial owners before disposing of land or property, currently registered as State property.

The third category of activists proposes to focus efforts on discussion and exchanges with Turkish civil society; to have a greater presence on the ground in Turkey. In France and in Northern America, there is an increasing number of organizations that want to educate and exchange perspectives with Turkish civil society. They hope for recognition throughout the reconciliation of civil societies, unavoidable with the development of knowledge, and thus hope for compensation.

Opportunities for DisTerrMem

On the Turkish side, the work of memory, according to Turkish political scientists and writer Cenzig Aktar, began with societal work, after the murder in Istanbul of the Turkish journalist and writer of Armenian origin, Hrant Dink. Turkish society decided for simple reasons, 'an amnestic society could not be cured by a state that lobotomized it. We should not wait for the State to decide one day to talk about Armenian, Greek, Chaldean genocides, we had to mobilize.'[4] It is no longer only intellectuals who mobilize, as in 2008, when Ahmet Insel, Baskin Oran, Ali Bayramoglu and Cenzig Aktar called for 'forgiveness. Turks address to Armenians' (CNRS 2010) which was signed by 32.000 people, but members of civil society mobilizing for this acknowledgment. The publication of numerous books on the Armenian genocide, works that highlight the Armenian-Turkish dialogue (Neyzi, Kharatyan 2010, Marian Insel, 2009), the organization of exhibitions, conferences,

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[4] See (Aktar, *The engagement of Turkish civil society in the recognition of the Armenian genocide,* www.senat.fr (http://www.senat.fr/ga/ga146/ga1462.html).

some restitutions of Armenian properties to foundations, the renovation of some churches and monuments, the discovery by many Turks that have an Armenian ancestor who converted to Islam to escape genocide, the growing contact between Turks and Armenian tourists from the diaspora who come in the footsteps of their ancestors and finally the mobility of students between the two countries are certainly first small but very important steps in the path of recognition of the Armenian genocide. Thus, in Turkey, on recent years, the gap between society and politics has profoundly widened, between on the one hand, Turkish civil society which has some interesting initiatives working on memory and reconciliation across the border of the two nation states, and on the other hand, politics in Ankara which continues to deny the Armenian genocide and to discriminate against the Armenian population in Turkey today (Kalfayan 2006).

Bernard Bruneteau (2019) in 'Génocides: usages et mésusages d'un concept', underlines a very important point, that we must not neglect the growing weight of what appears more and more as *an international civil society* as a relay of a public opinion sensitized and indignant in real time by the images and testimonies broadcasted by the media of conflict and violence. The efforts of Armenian civil society, and particularly through diaspora organisations at an international level, have been to promote recognition of the past and prevent future atrocities through international law based on a shared humanity that defies national boundaries. Such an approach is understood through a cosmopolitan frame. DisTerrMem therefore provides an opportunity to further explore the potential of agonistic practices at a more grass roots level in developing understanding and dialogue which permeates across border to move beyond conflictual memories of the past that shape relationships in the present.

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