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Literature Review:

The role of nation states in managing memories of disputed territories

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Contents

ABSTRACT

Issues of memory are closely linked to nation states' identities, and memories of a shared past play a pivotal role in the process of nation building. A history of shared suffering is regularly mentioned in official narratives with the expectation of making people rally around the flag. However, nation states equally have the power to use narratives based on particular memories to promote democratic pluralism within that country's territory.

This section of the literature review begins with a discussion linking the growing field of memory studies to political science research on 'the state'. In exploring different state structures and democratic cultures, these factors raise important questions around the possibility for agonistic interactions across different 'political regimes'. To examine the role of nation states in managing memories across disputed territories this section also discusses the centrality of borders to the modern nation state. Borders represent primary institutions of the state and bear both inclusive and exclusive characteristics. Borders are therefore places where the similarities and differences of certain groups expose themselves more vividly and also where 'transborder people' provide a potential challenge to state building projects. Rather than being at the periphery, borders are central to state building narratives.

In exploring the mechanisms in which nation states promote, as well as challenge, antagonistic memories of disputed territories this literature review also explores the role of education systems, political leaders and diaspora groups across numerous comparative case studies. Feminist research spanning the topics of memory, nationhood and peace building is also discussed in order to explore the potential for agonistic memory in breaking down essentialized constructions of identity (us/them; victim/perpetrator; masculine/feminine) supported through antagonistic narratives of the past.

Through these various perspectives, this section questions the possibilities of nation states engaging in agonistic practices and the political will to resist the temptation of imposing a uniform top down memory of the past.

Collective Memory and the State: An Introduction – Ryan Brasher

In this first section, Ryan Brasher introduces debates concerning the relationship between collective memory and state building projects. Through empirical research touching on a diverse range of case studies Ryan explores the literature on how memory is utilized across different regime types (liberal democracies to authoritarian) and state structures (centralized to federal systems) to ask where space exists for agonistic practices.

In his celebrated essay "What is a Nation?", Ernest Renan set down the key linkage between national identity and collective memory: a nation is not constituted by objective material factors, but my historical amnesia. A sense of togetherness develops by forgetting, as well as re-remembering the past. Complex events and inconvenient facts are ignored in favor of the mythical past. This past is constructed either as an impossibly idyllic time and space, or rooted in a traumatic but nevertheless glorified defeat, portraying the national forefathers as brave heroes in the face of impossible odds. The goal of this literature review is to ascertain how the state shapes collective memories that serve as the source through which national identity is constructed, and also how in turn memory can shape the state. This means linking the growing field of memory studies, heretofore rooted in cultural studies, with empirical political science research on the state. The field of memory studies is vast, and so is the literature on the state, so I make no attempt to develop a comprehensive survey of the literature. Rather, I seek to develop a thematic overview that points out major areas of current research and suggests potentially fruitful avenues for further study.

A lot of work has gone into establishing the link between the state and political identity, rooted in the sprawling constructivist literature on nationalism. Benedict Anderson, for instance, devotes a chapter in his "Imagined Communities" (1991) to the colonial state's use of the museum, the census, and maps to instill single unambiguous political identities in their subject populations along racial or religious lines. But while often referenced, the crucial role of collective memory in this process is not explained or theorized, as authors often remain unaware of the relatively new memory studies research program. Research explicitly based in memory studies, on the other hand, tends to ignore formal state

structures, often viewing the state in Foucauldian terms as an intangible system of power and hegemony – an understandable perspective given the culturalist and more post-modern roots of this research. Before moving forward, therefore, I briefly discuss and define what is meant by collective identity on one hand, and the state on the other.

The idea of collective memory derives from Maurice Halbwachs' classical work on the subject, distinguishing social memory or external memory from personal or inward memory. Both are interlinked with each other and shape each other, but collective memory does not operate according to the same processes, it has no consciousness (1980: 51). This is an important point: subsequent work has often used psychological terminology to argue for the existence of collective trauma that, if not effectively and openly dealt with, will result in adverse social outcomes, not unlike repression of trauma leads to mental health breakdown in individuals. Kansteiner makes the point that this improperly extends individual memory to the group and ignores the social and political processes that help create collective memory in the first place. Collective memory, instead, is a result of the interaction between underlying social traditions, and interest-driven elite memory-makers, and the mass of memory-consumers. Traumatic events are repressed primarily for political, not psychological reasons, and their repression does not result in any mental health disorder of the collective. Collective memory is not rooted in some kind of vague communal psyche, but in what Kansteiner refers to as the "material", social practices, symbols, and institutions (Kansteiner 2002: 185-188).

Assmann refers to this material institutionalized memory as cultural memory, to distinguish it from another form of collective memory, communicative memory, which lives on in everyday social interaction between eye-witnesses and the 2nd and 3rd generation. Cultural memory, on the other hand, is embodied in textbooks and monuments of literate societies, and in formalized songs and myths of oral societies. These items do not embody memory themselves, but trigger them in those who see or hear them. Consequently, the process of selecting which material items to focus on, and how to display them, is an intensely political one (Assmann 2008: 109-113). Even though states try to convey the image of a unified

collective memory, it is clear that multiple and often competing memories across different social groups and classes exist. The more powerful a group, the more likely it will be able to broadcast its own representation of memory. Consequently, the formation of collective, or cultural, memory, is not simply an aggregation of individual memories in society, but is an elite project, featuring not only politicians but also journalists, academics, educators, and journalists, which involves contestation over who gets to construct the overarching historical narrative, and how they do it (Langenbacher 2010: 30-31, 33-34).

Before discussing how collective memory shapes, and is shaped, by state structures, we also have to briefly define what we mean by the state. To begin with, in this literature review, I primarily focus on three aspects of the state. First, I look at the process through which the state as a tangible organizational structure and set of political institutions is formed, or conversely, may fail or fall apart. This also encompasses a discussion of relative state strength or weakness. Secondly, I examine the political "software" of the state: how these political institutions are operated by regime type, and particularly how collective memory is affected by a change from authoritarian to democratic regime type (see O'Neill 2012 for an introductory discussion of the state and regime). Formally structured center-periphery relations, the relative centralization or decentralization of state institutions, represents the third aspect of the state I seek to look at. More specifically, how do federal and unitary state structures shape collective memory, and vice versa. I do not discuss how specific areas of public policy, like education, shape and are shaped, by collective memory, as these issue areas are covered in other project participants' review of the nation-state and memory. I close by suggesting that the literature on collective memory, as well as that on politics and state structures, heretofore existing in largely separate universes, would benefit from a more explicit interaction with one another.

Regime Type, Democratization, and Transitional Justice:

When it comes to collective memory and the state, a majority of research has focused on democratization, transitional justice and "Vergangenheitsbewältigung", how to do deal with

traumatic events perpetrated by previous authoritarian regimes (Meyer 2008). Here the experience of post-World War II Germany generally serves as a benchmark. This literature generally carries the normative assumption that full democratic consolidation is best coupled with collective acknowledgement, and rectification, of past injustices. This, however, has to be balanced with the immediate need to integrate previous rulers, who could potentially spoil the transition. Overall, an inability or unwillingness to move away from a uniform collective memory glorifying the past is detrimental to stable democracy, as previously victimized groups will inevitably feel ignored and excluded from the national community (Langenohl 2008).

But the collective endeavor to honestly deal with the problems of the past may not automatically lead to a more inclusive national identity. The political theorist W. James Booth, the only scholar focusing on collective memory to be published in the American Political Science Review, ties these themes together in his investigation of how the 5th French republic, and particularly President Mitterand, dealt with the moral culpability of the Vichy regime (Booth 1999). Many French liberals and socialists, including Mitterand, eschewed taking responsibility for Vichy collaboration with the German drive to round up and eliminate the Jewish population in France during World War II, by arguing that French political identity was rooted in a community of will grounded in constitutional patriotism and open to anyone with these shared political values. For many critics of Mitterand, this smacked of an easy way out of admitting culpability. However, admitting to French guilt today in past Vichy crimes, would be to suggest a homogenous cultural primordial French identity, irrespective of regime type, with a collective memory, even if shameful, that some people share in, but others cannot. The principle of justice, therefore, can be in tension with the principles of constitutional liberal identity. Collective memory, and thus ownership, of past atrocities can lead to repentance and redemption, but also holds potential for exclusive nationalism. But this dilemma for inclusive democracy may be primarily theoretical, as a pure “Willensgemeinschaft” probably does not exist, leaving the American or French rhetoric of civic nationalism aside (Grant 2006).

In her comparative analysis of collective memory and democratization in the Ukraine and Spain, Shevel points to an empirical, not theoretical, tension between democracy and justice (Shevel 2011). Franco's successor's in Spain agreed to legalize all political parties, including the communists, and hold free and fair elections in response for opposition guarantees that officials of the ancien regime would not be prosecuted, and that a veil of silence would be cast over the Spanish civil war. In practice, this pact meant that the old nationalist narrative that Franco had saved Spain from the disorder and corruption of the Spanish Republic remained unchallenged. In public imagination, the Spanish Civil War was an act of madness, and its guilt rested on the Spanish people as a whole. The causes of the war, Franco's toppling of a democratically elected government, and the detrimental effect of military rule on the working class, were ignored. The Spanish pact of silence, did not result in social reconciliation or justice for Franco's victims, but it did allow Spanish democracy to develop unchallenged. Only 30 years after democratization, in 2007, with a new generation of leadership, was the pact of silence overturned in the law on historical memory. Republican victims of the civil war were now officially recognized, and the abuses of Franco's regime officially condemned. Furthermore, it now became illegal to conduct political activities in the Valley of the Fallen, a Francoist monument. The goal of the law, however, was not justice and retribution, with prosecution of authoritarian officials still not allowed. It also did not replace the old authoritarian narrative of Spanish disorder with one based on Republican and leftist grievances. Instead, it aimed for a pluralist imagination of the past, in order to avoid replacing one set of grievances with another. Instead of a unified memory of the controversial past, the goal of the law was to instill broad popular pride in the peaceful and orderly Spanish transition to democracy, which had been considered improbable by defenders of dictatorship.

Shevel argues that the struggle to impose a homogenous collective memory, rather than leave space for a pluralist one, has made democratization in the Ukraine more difficult. Nationalists and pro-Europeans insisted on rehabilitation of anti-Soviet fighters during World War II, whereas Russophiles and committed Communists could only view them as Nazi collaborators. Centrists in government had no desire to solve this dilemma, but played

off both sides in order to remain in power. And because of the modernist legacy the Soviet education system, all sides believed in the existence of one true national narrative, rendering unacceptable the recommendation by Ukrainian historians to focus on the multiplicity of individual social history, like in Spain. According to Shevel, collective memory is not a pre-requisite for stable democracy – rather, democratic practice helps create the conditions for various memories to exist with one another. And it may suggest that rather than attempting to deal with justice and truth right away, silence and compromise may be necessary, at least initially, for democracy to flourish, particularly in polarized societies. This underscores the idea that in democratic transitions, the main consideration ought not to be the adverse psychological consequences brought about by collective repression of memory, but rather elite agreement, across political divides, on the unhindered functioning of democratic institutions and moratorium on public discussion of the controversial past. Inevitably, in these conditions, it appears, the problematic past will resurface over time, and can then be dealt with in a more constructive, and less conflictual manner. It is, of course, unclear, in how far this scenario is realistic outside of Spain, and other Southern European and Latin American countries that experienced pact-based transitions to democracy, particularly when political actors are unwilling to make basic compromises.

Shevel's findings based on her qualitative comparison of Spain and the Ukraine comparisons also find resonance in Forrest & Johnson's quantitative analysis of public monument creation, alteration, and destruction, across different regime types in post-Communist Eastern Europe. The authors have created a database of over 2500 incidents of state and non-state activity in regard to monuments, one important way in which collective memory is constructed and represented by memory-makers to the mass public (Forrest & Johnson 2011). Their methodology, and particularly the plethora of cases, does not allow them to dig into the details of each monument. However, the overall pattern indicates that in consolidated Eastern European democracies, there is a significantly greater proportion of private monument-based activity, as compared to authoritarian and hybrid regimes. One can surmise, therefore, that in democracies, the state allows for great citizen involvement in the construction of collective memory, and does not put as much effort into projecting a

particular kind of homogenous vision of the nation. Forrest and Johnson do acknowledge that greater private monument activity in democracies may also indicate more instances of monument vandalism, particularly of a xenophobic right-wing kind. However, overall, democracies seem to allow for a plural, diverse, and non-uniform collective memory.
This would also indicate that democracies have greater potential to solve problems associated with ethnic diversity and ideological polarization. They also provide the space to allow for an honest engagement between people, and groups of people, with very different, and sometimes mutually conflictual, collective memories – what Bull and Hansen (2016) refer to as "agonistic" memory-making.

Rather than an analytical scaffolding to understand state-memory interaction, advocates of agonistic memory propose a normative framework that states ought to pursue in order to forestall domestic conflict as well as give a voice to oppressed social groups. For instance, in the context of indigenous grievances against the Australian settler state, Maddison (2019) argues that attempts at reconciliation and closure, doomed to failure, should be avoided. Instead, rigorous historical debate ought to be institutionalized. Rather than agreeing on a particular narrative of events, the process of contentious dialogue between very different perspectives would, over time, lead to a common frame of reference. Therefore, the critical indigenous voice dissatisfied with reconciliation proposals should not be viewed as a policy failure, but should be encouraged and brought into the political sphere. At the same time, the voice of settlers, fearful that giving up on the myth of the egalitarian Australian farmer would lose their legitimacy as landowners and their status as "sons of the soil", should also be given a hearing, since repression may lead to its reemergence in a more radical populist and antagonistic frame of reference that might increase political polarization and lessen the chance of agonistic dialogue. It should be kept in mind, however, that Maddison's proposal occurs in the context of a democratic state where there is space for agonistic interaction, or at least the possibility thereof. But what about agonistic memory-making in hybrid or authoritarian regimes, particularly at the official state level? More work needs to be done to develop proposals in these contexts, where government pressure to create a uniform national narrative, based on a homogenous collective memory, is much greater.

State-Building and Collective Memory

In addition to the literature that focuses on collective memory, regime type, and democratic transitions, collective memory has been studied in the context of state creation and state development over time. While not nearly as plentiful as the transitional justice literature, I take a brief look at a number of case studies and case comparisons delving into these issues. They have particular significance in the context of our project on disputed territories, as the formation of internal state structures within a fixed set of boundaries will leads to contestation of collective identity within the nation-state, as well as across its boundaries.

Greenberg's paired comparative analysis of partition in Israel and Palestine versus India and Pakistan is a useful starting point to examine how state creation and the conflict over borders helps shape collective memory across several generations. Greenberg (2005), blissfully unaware of Kansteiner's critique of the psychological framework, argues that post-partition states repress the memory of the horrors of partition, downplay atrocities committed by one's own founding fathers, and exalt the horrendous suffering of victims, particularly women, as heroic, in order to construct a homogenous national identity. The wounds of partition, not unlike "phantom limbs" of amputees, are recreated in collective memory to keep up a sense of grievance against the perceived enemy. The new states of India, Israel, and Pakistan, in particular, ignored the horrific and senseless violence of partition, preferring to focus on a triumphant narrative of independence in the face of overwhelming odds against a powerful external aggressor, whether British colonialists, aggressive neighboring Arab states, or the dangerous Hindu majority. Stateless Palestinians, however, have woven their national identity around the collective memory of defeat and loss of homeland at the hands of technologically superior and Western-supported Jewish colonialists.

According to Greenberg, collective memory faces a turning point when the second or "hinge" generation, with no personal memory of partition, begins to construct its own

memory of partition in a formalized manner. This is akin to Assmann's "floating gap" between communicative and cultural memory, when material objects and institutions replace everyday social interaction as the primary repository of collective memory. Although many in this generation simply accept the given narratives, there are many who question it, because the glorification of the founding fathers no longer seems such a pressing necessity, as statehood has been achieved and consolidated. For example, across all four countries the more secularist national narrative has faced challenges from the religious right-wing. Another form of rebellion, albeit limited to academia, has been revisionist historians who seek to dispel uncritical nationalist accounts of partition. This process has been more pronounced in Israel and India, whose political and constitutional framework allow for more critical engagement with the state. Israeli academics, for instance, after opening official archives, were able to show that the state narrative ignored wide-spread violence and ethnic-cleansing against the Arab population as the major cause of their exodus – and not simply inept leaders or overblown hysteria in the Palestinian community. In India, the subaltern studies approach, in addition to problematizing colonial history, has highlighted the continued oppression of religious and ethnic minorities. Even among Palestinians, whose intense sense of loss and grievance would not seem like fertile ground for critical engagement with the past, revisionist historians have started questioning the competence and democratic legitimacy of Palestinian leaders before 1948. Their goal has been to develop a reality-based history, without giving up on the community's moral claims or grievances.

In Greenberg's account, collective memory, while important in creating a sense of national identity, is primarily an outcome of the large structural forces of state formation. In a comparative historical analysis of colonial and post-colonial Nicaragua and Costa Rica, Consuelo Cruz (2000), on the other hand, argues that collective memory itself can help determine the trajectory of state development. She asks how Costa Rica has been able to develop stable state institutions, consolidate liberal democracy, and feature relatively robust economic growth, particularly since 1948, while Nicaragua has faced considerable social conflict, dictatorship, revolutions, and economic scarcity. Because structural

conditions in and surrounding the two countries have historically been fairly similar, Cruz eschews typical socio-economic and geopolitical arguments. Instead, divergent, what Cruz calls “declarative” identities, rooted in distinct collective memories, have been the main drivers of divergent state development. Costa Ricans have historically identified themselves as both diligent and peaceable people who are able to solve conflicts through compromise and cooperation. Nicaraguans, on the other hand, have a self-image of unruly people whose leaders are not above bending the rules for their own benefit, and who fare best under strong authoritarian rulers. According to Cruz, these images are not based in historical fact, but instead reflect a selective collective memory perpetuated since the time of the Spanish conquistadores.

The roots of this memory stem from the slightly different timing in the creation of the founding of these two colonies. Nicaragua was established somewhat earlier, and quickly experienced conflict between creole (local Spanish-origin) population and clerical officials, who criticized their treatment of the indigenous population. After murdering the bishop and rebelling against the Spanish crown, creole elites were punished, governance was taken over by officials in Guatemala, and an official history created that denounced the greedy, oppressive, and disorderly conduct of Nicaraguans. The Costa Rican conquest was interrupted by an indigenous uprising and not consolidated until 20 years later, with colonial officials fully aware of the opprobrium that the Nicaraguans had faced in consequence of their behavior. As a result, reports sent to Madrid stressed local harmony among creole elites and the church, and model treatment of the native population. Although not reflecting the harsh reality of life, colonial officials used this narrative to elicit funds and special privileges, including local autonomy, from the Spanish crown. Because the official history was not updated, these two narratives remained unchallenged for over 200 years, until the time of independence.

Drawing on this repertoire of compromise and hard work, post-independence politicians in Costa Rica set about developing a power-sharing agreement, the “Pact of Harmony”, between competing elites, overcame intermittent violent factional disputes, and created an

itinerant government that was obliged to rotate between the four major regional centers. In the wake of an early financial crisis, the opposition did not resort to violence and civil war, but formed a commission advocating land reform and developmental policies that would empower citizens to seek their own prosperity. By the mid-19th Century, long before the establishment of democracy, the imagination of Costa Rican exceptionalism as a haven of peace and harmony in a dangerous Central American neighborhood had become entrenched. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, post-independence leaders did not have the same access to a collective memory of compromise. Just as in colonial times, political rivals engaged in mutual demonization. Even though a form of democracy was able to hold on for three decades in the late 19th Century, the head of state, the president, was obliged to abstain from political remarks in order to avoid inflaming social conflict again. This, in turn, led to a foreclosure of any possibility of altering the rhetorical repertoire leaders might draw on. This democratic interlude was therefore viewed as an anomaly, and in the public imagination, Nicaragua's binary choice between either anarchy or autocracy became entrenched. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, even the bloody civil war of 1948 following a disputed presidential election was not able to alter confidence that the country would return to democratic normalcy.

From the accounts above it is clear that collective memory serves as a key mechanism that helps connect communal identity and formal political structures. Collective memory functions as a resource that elites can draw from to construct a particular kind of political identity. Political structures help determine the formation of collective memory, which in turn may affect all kinds of other political outcomes. Based on very recent research in post-Arab spring Tunisia, Marcusa (2019) argues that divergent state-building experiences of two small towns has shaped the extent to which international jihadist organizations, including ISIS, have been able to recruit fighters for conflict in Syria and Iraq. Because these two towns were incorporated into the colonial Tunisian state in very different ways, local actors, drawing on very distinct collective memories, have engaged in communal economic and political life very differently. Shortly after the uprising that toppled Tunisia's long-time dictator in 2011, the local mosque in Sidi Bouzid, the home of the street vendor Mohamed

Bouazizi, whose self-immolation set off the Tunisian Revolution, was taken over by a radical Salafi organization that has since supplied 23 fighters to various jihadi hotspots. Radical Islamists tried to do the same in the town of Metlaoui, but were repelled by local residents.

According to Marcusa, susceptibility toward jihadi ideology, cannot be explained by relying on socio-economic causes. Poverty, unemployment and disillusionment with Tunisian politics have been pervasive in both towns. The difference, however, is that collective action in Metlaoui is based on a collective memory of formal unionized protest politics, often directed against the state. Across Tunisia, the French colonial state quickly worked to disband traditional tribal society in the late 19th Century. In many parts of the country, including Sidi Bouzid, resistance to the state came in the form of disorganized banditry. In Metlaoui, however, the discovery of phosphate resources in the 1890s led to the development of a state-owned mine. Adverse working conditions in the mine, in turn, led to union activity. Over many decades, therefore, working class men in the town became accustomed to negotiations with and strikes against the authorities running the mine. The experience, and then memory, of receiving material concessions in response helped institutionalize a collective memory of organized, but peaceful, resistance to the state, even when the economic importance of the mine decreased over time. When Jihadists came to recruit young men in Metlaoui, the memory of concrete benefits in response to engagement with, and not withdrawal from, formal political structures, led them to eschew the symbolic future benefits as well as communal acceptance and cohesion offered to them. In Sidi Bouzid, however, young men disaffected by the prolonged experience of unemployment and lack of hope, and without the same memory resources to draw on, became ready recruits. The same formal political institutions, in this case the French colonial state and its successor in Tunisia, can thus help develop very divergent collective memories in different localities within the same territorial space – of course, in conjunction with some different antecedent conditions – the existence of natural resources and the development of the mine.

Federalism, the Unitary State, and Collective Memory

Very little work has been done on the intersection between collective memory and the formal territorial distribution of power within a state. Here I examine two interesting case studies, where the authors, tellingly none of them political scientists, examine the effect of institutional structures on collective memory and political identity in Sri Lanka and Belgium respectively. Although both of these articles are not primarily interested in the question of federal and unitary states as such, they almost inadvertently examine these as causal variables that shape the collective identity of the two countries over time. According to Seoighe (2016), the British-bequeathed centralized unitary state in Sri Lanka has shaped a collective identity over time that is intolerant of regional diversity and autonomy. In Belgium, on the other hand, Rimé et al (2015) argue that the introduction of federalism and regional autonomy has created a generational collective memory divide, with older Flemish-speakers much more adamant about the need for autonomy and even secession, whereas younger Flemish-speakers are much more comfortable with their Belgian identity.

While Seoighe (2016) is primarily concerned with nationalist discourse by the government in Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE-insurgency in 2009, her work also sheds light on how constitutional choices might shape the development of collective memory over time. The unitary state structure of Sri Lanka, according to Seoighe (2016), was the product of British imperialism. It was a novel intervention on an island that had historically been politically decentralized and governed by a variety of kingdoms with little interest in developing a homogenous political identity based on religion or language. When post-independence elections brought leaders from the Buddhist and Sinhalese-speaking majority to power for the first time, their collective memory, shaped by over a century of British rule and colonial discourse, interacted with the centralized state structure to envision a homogenous Buddhist-Sinhalese nation constructed in response to the threat of the "other", primarily Tamil Hindus, but later on all communities outside of the Buddhist-Sinhalese imagined community. This majority collective memory left no space for political or cultural autonomy of minorities, and almost invariably led to the development of a violent counter-hegemonic movement among Tamil-speakers concentrated in the northern part of the country.

This nationalist collective memory came into sharp relief after the military victory over the LTTE in 2009, which the Rajapaksa government constructed as a continuation of the mythology surrounding ancient Sinhala kings defeating invading Tamil forces from mainland India. The largely Tamil-speaking north-east of Sri Lanka has since been subjected to colonial-style rule, with Buddhist religious sites restored or constructed on former Hindu or Christian sites, a plan to change the ethnic composition of the area by re-settling Sinhalese populations from other parts of the country, disenfranchising and disadvantaging Tamils in the economic reconstruction after the conflict, and above all the military occupation of former LTTE strongholds as symbolic of the consolidation of Sinhala identity in the country. War monuments commemorating the heroes of the largely Sinhala military have been set up everywhere, and archeological teams have been sent to uncover ancient Buddhist sites in order to undermine the notion of an ancient Tamil homeland and to signal complete domination over Tamil identity, with no monuments to LTTE fighters allowed.

In an interesting corollary, Rimé et al. (2015) describe how evolving federal state structures in Belgium in the last 50 years, along with changing socio-economic regional fortunes, have shaped the collective memory of different generations of Flemish and French speaking Belgians. They are particularly interested in how regional grievances have shifted from one generational cohort to the next. Based on extensive survey research they find that cohorts whose formative childhood experiences developed before Belgium made a decisive shift toward federalism and regional autonomy harbored considerably stronger grievances toward the central government compared to later cohorts. The institutional change also coincided with a gradual re-balancing of economic vitality from the traditional industrial hub in French-speaking Wallonia to Flemish-speaking Flanders. The generational effect was particularly strong among Flemish speakers as compared to French-speakers. Older Flemish speakers grew up with a sense both cultural grievance due to the historically privileged status of French, as well as economic grievance at the rural north being neglected vis-a-vis the industrialized south. These grievances in turn fueled the rise of Flemish populist politics, both within established political parties, and the more strident nationalist party. In turn, younger Flemish-speaking Belgians do not feel the same urgency to push for greater

autonomy and secession. In fact, their identification with the Belgian state is considerably higher compared to older cohorts, while their regional identification is lower. While the authors, all psychologists, are more interested in the effects of social and political conditions on individuals, one can conclude that institutional structures also have long-term macro-political consequences as well.

The findings support the idea that ethno-federal structures, combined with improved economic conditions, can help alleviate contentious politics in multi-ethnic societies. Alternatively, centralized political structures can help exacerbate, and even create ethnic minority grievances in the first place, which feed into minority collective memory and can then fuel secessionist political movements with the potential to turn violent. The articles also implicitly raise the question whether federal political structures might serve as the basis through which agonistic memory-making, the honest interaction between victim and oppressor, the powerless and the powerful, the periphery and the center, is formally institutionalized into the political process.

Conclusion:

Although a burgeoning field, memory studies has so far elicited a limited response from political science as a discipline. There has been some work by constructivist international relations scholars and political philosophers (Langenbacher 2010, Goertsch 2008), but particularly when it comes to the empirical analysis of the internal political dynamics of societies, comparative politics in other words, there is a bit of a lacuna in the literature. A perusal of the leading journals in the field, including the American Political Science Review, Comparative Politics, and World Politics, for the term “collective memory” and its main theorist, “Halbwachs” reveal at most 1 or 2 research articles across all their years of publication. There has been a very recent attempt to begin connecting political and memory studies more explicitly, particularly in the field of political culture (McQuaid and Gensburger 2019), although many of the contributors do not themselves come from the political science discipline.

How might this literature interact with the agonistic memory approach by Bull and Hansen? From one perspective, at the nation-state level, it is clear that only democratic regime types, or at least those with significant protections of the freedoms of expression and academic research, offer the possibility of honest assessment of the past without a pre-determined top-down narrative. And even there, it often takes decades of democratic practice before the space for honest discussion can open up, as Shevel argues in her comparative study of Spain and Ukraine. At an official level, engaging in agonistic memory-making depends on the political will to resist the temptation of imposing a uniform collective memory, and to open up discussion from a variety of perspectives and individual experiences. According to Greenberg, revisionist historians might also be said to prepare the framework for an agonistic memory approach by questioning official narratives, even in less liberal societies. Nevertheless, research by Cruz and Marcusa also shows that collective memory often does not develop as a result of conscious policy choices, but as unforeseen by-products of other political developments.

What may be potential further avenues of research for political scientists in the field of comparative politics interested in memory studies, and particularly the agonistic memory approach? One suggestion would be to move beyond discussions of transitional justice to start analyzing specific institutional arrangements and their effects on memory-making. In how far, for instance, do unitary, federal, consociational, or ethno-federal structures, and their particular versions, provide space for agonistic memory-making? Furthermore, how does agonistic memory function in the context of authoritarian regimes, who do not have political incentives to encourage honest and open dialogue between groups and individuals, and are fundamentally opposed to giving space to multiple contending collective memories. In this context, agonistic memory-making will have difficulty finding the space it needs to bring about the necessary contentious dialogue.

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Borders, Ethnic Groups, 'Tribes', and Memory - Vahe Boyajian

Vahe Boyajian, Research Fellow at the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography (National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan) draws on the wide-ranging literature to outline some connections between the phenomena of borders, 'tribes' and memory. Vahe demonstrates these debates by narrowing the scope to a specific geographical area incorporating Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

The unabridged scholarly contributions on borders and borderlands, 'tribes' and ethnic groups, nationalism, state politics and related issues provide a massive literature for various approaches and discourses, intellectual debates and theories. The terms 'borders' and 'borderlands' are used by a wide range of intellectuals and academics, by representatives of various fields of social life of humankind, which indicates that the interest towards this phenomenon and its significance is immensely high, yet this also means that the topic is not just one and unified, rather there are many topics.

Malcolm Anderson, for example, defining characteristics of borders stresses that borders are both institutions and processes. As institutions, they mark and draw lines between states thus featuring the sovereign status of them, as well as that of the citizenship. As processes, borders have more than one function; they become instruments in the hand of the state to conduct policy and maintain control over the people. Borders, thus, play a crucial role in creating the nation and the state (Anderson 1996: 1-3). That is the reason why borders have also become a term in discourses and narratives of phenomena like nationalism and identity.

In defining the borders and borderlands Oscar Martinez (1998: 5-25) concentrates on several crucial processes: *transnational interaction*, where the borders act as a place of interchange of foreign customs, ideas, institutions, etc.; *conflicts*, both international and ethnic; *accommodation* of those conflicts; *separateness*, when the inhabitants of the border zones distinguish themselves both from people on the other side of the border, as well as from those in the interior areas.

The socio-cultural and territorial elements of the borders and boundaries are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Here one can face a danger of categorization, if identifying these patterns as separate phenomena. In fact, in anthropological research all these patterns have been studied by an emphasis on differences, a long lasting process that has resulted in groundbreaking literature on each aspect.

According to Fredrik Barth, the ethnic groups are socially constructed, whose members have a specific strategy to use and manipulate their cultural identity, in other words to stress and undermine certain aspects depending on the context. For Barth, the boundaries between ethnic groups are maintained by cultural features, which, of course, does not suppose that those features are the natural continuation of the previous 'culture' (Barth 1998: 38).

Sandra Wallman, brings the idea of 'opposition' into the realm of the investigation of the boundaries between the groups. She argues that social boundaries do not just have two sides, but are characterized by an interface line between inside and outside. Any social boundary must be viewed as a consequence of the various possible relationships between identity and interface. Boundary marks the edge of a social system, the interface between that system and one of those contiguous upon it and it has a significance for the members of these systems (Wallman 1978: 207).

Similarly, Anthony Cohen argues, 'a community exists only by virtue of its opposition to another community'. Cohen also argues that traditional spatial ties, kinship and class were transformed in the new age, so the structural boundaries are diminishing or eroding; instead, the aspects of differences are being transported into the minds of the people (Cohen 1986: 2).

Of course, there has been also criticism on such approaches, one point being that it emphasizes the internal identification rather than external constraint and the shaping influence of wider structures (social, economic, political), such as those of class and the state. If ethnicity depends on ascription from both sides of the group boundary, then one

should accept the fact that by that members of one group might be able to impose their categorisations on the members of another group (Jenkins 1997: 23).

Another important dimension of borders and borderlands is their featuring as state, geopolitical and territorial boundaries. The state borders are usually referred as real borders, in distinguishing them from the symbolic ones. These dimensions of borderlands have been mainly the focus of political and economic studies. In many anthropological works, state borders figured as if not the key objects of the focus, at least they are touched in terms of explaining the territorial and geopolitical aspects of the given locality (see Cohen 1965; Cole & Wolf 1974; Lavie 1990; Leach 1954; van Bruinessen 1992).

Nowadays there is a growing importance of border perspectives in political anthropology, where the relations between border areas and their nations and states have more importance than the local culture. Currently, the interdisciplinary nature of border studies prevails, although it also leads to uncertainties, becoming more a fashion, rather than an approach (Wilson & Donnan 2012: 16-17). In this regard, Mark Salter states '… The border is a primary institution of the contemporary state, the construction of a geopolitical world of multiple states, and the primary ethico-political division between the possibility of politics inside the state and the necessity of anarchy outside the state' (Salter 2011: 66-67).

Borders bearing both inclusive and exclusive characteristics, thus, are places where the similarities and distinctiveness of certain groups expose themselves more vividly. This, of course, applies to ethnic groups as well. Hence, the ideas of ethnic identity, otherness, uniqueness, and related phenomena more explicitly are found at borderlands. Ethnicity and its correlate, national identity, is a fundamental force found at all borders, and it remains the bedrock of many political, economic and social activities which continue to befuddle the institutions and agents of the state, in the borderlands and in metropolitan centres of power and influence (Donnan & Wilson 1999: 5-6).

Taking the borders and borderlands as loci for conflicts (Martinez: ibid), the question of actors of the process emerges. They can be diverse groups of people (united and/or separated on ethnic, social, political, economic backgrounds) and institutions. Those groups might be characterized as ranked or unranked, yet neither of them is static. Rapid changes affect the preliminary adopted categories, and as Donald Horowitz suggests: 'Among the engines of change is ethnic conflict itself' (Horowitz 1985: 32).

In his attempt to define the concept of 'ethnic group', Horowitz, along with other attributes, talks about 'genealogical doubts' (when group members try to pass) and 'permanent distinctiveness' of certain groups, by that stressing the elastic nature of ethnicity; '…Ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers 'tribes', 'races', 'nationalities', and castes' (ibid: 51-53).

The word 'tribe', in its turn, is one of the most used and misused terms in describing many different kinds of social structures, formations and groups. Tapper suggests that:

> *Tribe* may be used loosely of a localized group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader, both features being commonly attributable to interaction with states. Such tribes also form parts of larger, usually regional, political structures of tribes of similar kinds; they do not usually relate directly with the state, but only through these intermediate structures. The more explicit term confederacy or confederation should be used for local group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and perhaps class composition, yet is politically unified usually under a central authority. (Tapper 1983: 6-9).

It is worth noting the importance of the role of the tribes in the state formation in the geographical areas decided upon at the beginning of this piece. As noted above, borders, or

in other words, demarcated territory, are the primary institution of the contemporary state, though, alongside with other attributes of state, like state power, legitimacy, judicial sovereignty are regarded as aspirations. The aim of the states is to obtain these features, but in reality, not all of the states are successful in this (Khoury & Kostiner 1990: 6-7).

Diverse groups within the state possess the capacity to limit the power of the state in various aspects, but notably in the sphere of territorial dominance. The accommodation or, encapsulation of the tribes into the social, political and economic life of the state varies depending on the capacity of the state. In their turn, tribes also change in course of time: the traditional social structures decline thus pushing the tribes towards inevitable transformations.

Joel Migdal notes that tribes and state form a dialectical symbiosis by mingling and sustaining, sometimes trying even to destroy each other he writes:

> Maximal state-ness means a centralized, bureaucratized administration that permits little autonomy for tribal groups; it means that the society acknowledges the state's legitimacy over a clearly demarcated territory with established frontiers and that it is fully assimilated into a single nation, with the state being the embodiment of the society's collective will. Minimal state-ness, by contrast, means a highly decentralized state authority that permits vast autonomy for tribal groups who do not accept state authority over the territory within the specific borders claimed by the state and who do not subscribe to the same ideological precepts that the state wishes to impose on the society. In the Middle East, because the degree of state-ness varies widely between maximalist and minimalist, interactions between states and tribal groups also vary widely (Migdal 1985).

Ernest Gellner in his description of the phenomenon of tribalism in the Middles East emphasizes several constituents – segmentary lineage organization; weak, quasi-elective, or even fully elective leadership; symbiosis of pastoral and agricultural populations;

complementarity with holy lineages; external trade and pilgrimage routes; external ideological input; the wider political game; the mercenary option (Gellner 1983: 109-114). The combination of some of these elements, sometimes all of them, is applicable to almost all the tribal groups in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The habitat of most of the tribal groups is mainly peripheral, thus placing them in border zones of the mentioned states.

Among a wide range of reasons for the continuing prominence of tribalism, ethnicity, and conflict in this region at least three can be attributed to these countries. First, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan all are multi-ethnic countries (despite the fact that in Iran, for instance, no ethnic minority is recognized at the level of constitution). Second, many ethnic groups (ironically with traditional tribal structures) are transborder peoples (Baloch – inhabiting bordering areas of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; Turkomans – Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan; Pashtuns – alongside the Durand line, in former North-West Frontier Province, now FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas, etc.). Third, the relative weakness and the limited capacity of at least two of these states (Banuazizi & Weiner 1986: 3-7).

Subsequently, rising and shaping of ethnic and even national movements cannot be limited merely by the boundaries of an industrialised society, as Gellner suggests (Gellner 2006: 46). Farhan Siddiqi, for instance, talking about the politics of ethnicity in Pakistan reasonably explicates the socio-economic settings of the Baloch movement as one of a tribal society; the Sindhi ethnonational endeavors—as an example in rural environment; and the Muhajir's movement—as a case in an urban setting (Siddiqi 2012: 3). Siddiqi deals also with the germination of the ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, which he considers the responsibility of both the government and the state. Ascribing infrastructural power to the government and the despotic power to the state, Siddiqi writes:

> … despotic powers have been most readily applied in order to resolve ethnic conflicts than have political strategies of accommodation and compromise. Even when accommodation and compromise have been applied, they have been largely

> symptomatic of the state's contrivance in co-opting radical elites and their respective ethnic organisations without attending to the larger political, social and economic problems that non-dominant ethnic groups face (ibid: 114).

Another argument the author uses for elucidating the current politics of ethnicity in Pakistan concerns the intra-ethnic conflict, which is labelled as 'an essential reality' (ibid: 112). In all three cases, the internal problems hinder the resistance of the ethnic groups against the state. Siddiqi emphasises the fact that 'cultural homogeneity in a group does not necessarily translate into common political goals and objectives' (p. 117). Especially among the Baloch, the inter-tribal conflicts and the detachment of many *sardars* (tribal leaders) from the rest of the population, their co-operation with the state at certain levels play into the hands of the central authorities. Given the fractured nature of the struggle against the state and the lack of a nationwide agenda for the Baloch, Sindhis, and the Muhajirs, calling those movements national seems debatable.

A volume edited by Magnus Marsden (Marsden 2010) comprising more than a dozen contributions on the identity issues on multiple levels (ethnic, religious, sectarian, gender, etc.) also gives a comprehensive picture of nowadays Pakistan. The range of the topics is quite impressive – from state policies towards ethnic and religious minorities to individual and collective identity.

Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern emphasise the importance of two key elements regarding the collective identity of a given group – the notions of memory and notions of landscape;

> Memory and place, via landscape (including seascape), can be seen as crucial transducers whereby the local, national and global are brought into mutual alignment; or as providing sites where conflicts between these influences are played out. Such a theoretical scheme can also be seen as providing an alternative way of studying identity to the concentration on nationalism and national senses of identity as phenomena *per se.* It can help to re-establish a sphere of studies for social

> anthropology that would integrate aspects of earlier community-based approaches with approaches that emphasise political change, citizenship, national identity, historical influences, and similar broad factors (Stewart & Strathern 2003: 2).

Coming to the phenomenon of *memory*, it is noteworthy that different types of memories (individual, collective, historical, etc.) (Bull & Hansen 2016; Bosch 2016; Tamm 2013) are used by people, both at individual and group levels, as well as by institutions (state, etc.) differently depending on the socio-cultural context or/and political expediency. There can also be examples of individual stories and collective histories deeply rooted in the memory of the representatives of a given group that 'migrate' beyond the boundaries of a certain cultural and social milieu, thus applying a trans-border nature to memory (Weinreich 2010).

The notion of historical memory can be associated with cultural heritage of a group of people, which, in its turn is tightly interwoven with phenomena like national, ethnic identity, and nationalism. In this regard, Benedict Anderson argues that 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being' (Anderson 2006: 12).

Somewhat similar stance advocates Ugo Fabietti (2011): while exploring the roots of the Baloch nationalism in Pakistan, he brings up the connection between the notions of memory and nationalism. Fabietti stresses the importance of distinction between the local identity memories and the imported ideas. Different values, models, behavioral codes, in other words cultural elements that precede nationalism 'are not always simultaneously active. Indeed, many of them are, so to speak, 'dormant' – or to use an expression by Aleida Assmann (Assman, A. (1999). *Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses*. München: Beck), 'stored' in what she herself calls the 'memory-archive'… the discourse of Balochi nationalism is founded on a form of memory-function, which takes elements of the memory-archive and organises them according to a purpose, 'Within the memory-function, these ideas, values, symbols and behaviours 'retrieved' from the memory

archive interact with other elements which Balochi nationalism had absorbed during and after colonial era (Fabietti: 112-113).

However, it should be noted that in case of the Baloch, historical memory does not necessarily always manifest itself in a coherent and solid way. Depending on variety of situations and circumstances, many tribes in both Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan in a way select specific constituents (remembrances of their heroic past, biographies of legendary leaders, 'crafted' genealogies, etc.) of their memory archive to function as legitimate advantages in the relations with both inter-tribal and state level. A vivid example, which floats in the air of Iranian Balochistan, can be the battle at Nalak gorge in Sarhadd – historically attested but somewhat of little importance in terms of strategical outcome between the tribes and the British military expedition during the colonial period. The struggle of the local Baloch tribes against the British more than a century ago in modern times is put into the wider context of the Iran-West confrontation. The interactions between the Baloch tribes and the British in Sarhadd is illustrated by General R. Dyer in his book 'The Raiders of Sarhadd' (Dyer 1921), which has been translated into Persian and cited by the Baloch tribes as a kind of 'document' attesting their importance. By referring to these events the Baloch position themselves as key actors and manifest their loyalty to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Meantime, the state also manipulates with separate components of the Balochi memory-archive in case there is a need to secure their support and allegiance to the central government. If the memory of once fierce warriors and tribal 'romanticism', their involvement in the armies of the Sassanian kings of pre-Islamic Iran attested in 'Shahname' and other ballads serves as a proof of their legitimate role in maintaining Iran's integrity and security and acts as an identity marker for the Baloch, the same elements of the memory are manipulated by the state for controlling the volatile borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan by hiring the Baloch as a paramilitary forces. If the genealogies of some Baloch tribes present them as descendants of, for instance, Abd al-Qadir Gilani (a prominent figure of the Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood) stressing their advantage over other Baloch tribes, the latter engage in a competition to 'craft' their own genealogies with no less enthusiasm 'pulling' their lineage back to times immemorial.

All these elements of memory-archive are indispensable tools both in the hands of the tribes and the state to regulate and maintain their relations, to establish control, to figure as legitimate authorities and protect the inherited statuses. In this regard, memory-archives should be viewed as phenomena that play key role in *loci* characterized by mosaic of borders, ethnic groups, and tribes.

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State education systems: memory, identity, nationalism - Agnieszka Nowakowska

In this section Agnieszka Nowakowska (University of Warsaw) draws on her expertise concerning history narratives in education to explore the relationship between the nation state, schooling systems, memory and nationalism. Agnieszka discusses the role of teachers as active 'memory makers' and how history (and other subjects) provide an important site of antagonistic memory. The discussion concludes by setting out the possibilities of adopting agonistic approaches to teaching, developing resources and encouraging critical thinking.

There is no doubt that the state school system is extremely important in not only educating younger generation but also in the upbringing of future citizens of every country (Williams 2014b, p. 2). Schools are institutions where we can observe the processes of knowledge exchange and socialization simultaneously. What is more, as Michael Apple noticed, although school knowledge may pretend to be neutral and objective, it is always involves the sharing of values and ideologies (Apple 1991). The process of passing knowledge in schools is never innocent: 'it is an ideological process that serves the interests of particular classes and social groups' (Podeh 2000, p. 66). Both, at the beginning of the 19th century, when the system came into existence and now, it is the state that plays a pivotal role in schools' existence. As Williams put it: '(at school) the state is always at the table, even if silent and unacknowledged' (Williams 2014a, p. VIII). It is all possible thanks to different mechanisms of control. Schools in most countries are financed by the state, school curriculum and textbook narrations are at least approved by the state, teachers are obliged to implement the curriculum and examination system checks if they do it correctly (Low-Beer 2003, p. 3, Podeh 2000, p. 65).

The social results of the relationship between state and school system are enormous. Michel Apple stressed that school system legitimizes and reproduces the existing social structure (Apple 1991). Younger generations are shaped by narrations written by dominant the community (Podeh 2000, p. 66, Williams 2014a, p. 3). State and elites decide what should be taught at schools, what information is relevant and what can be omitted: 'Thus schools are said to control not only people and meaning but also confer cultural legitimacy

on the knowledge of specific groups' (Young 1971). Thanks to that, the status quo of inequality is maintained and the dominant position of elites is held (Kanu 2006, p. 5).

Not only does the school system work as a tool of legitimization but it helps also to shape a sense of identity and belonging of younger generations. It has also the capacity to influence their emotions, views, opinions, deeds and habits. In liberal democracies they socialize future citizens, that will take part in elections (Clark 2008, Low-Beer 2003). Thanks to close relationship with a market (Kanu 2006, p. 13) it also gives youngsters knowledge, skills and habits required by economic system.

From the very beginning of its existence public education systems were involved in creating and constructing a specific community which is a nation. Modern nations, nation states and public schooling system are coexisting phenomena and mutually dependent. Emergence of modern, national identities and development of nation states would not be possible without public, mass, state-controlled school (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1983; Smith 1999). Schools created modern nations and modern national identity. Even today close relationships between the state and educational systems pose a threat for schools to be turned into a form of nationalistic propaganda (Low-Beer 2003, p. 6).

Nations, those 'imagined communities' possess 'collectively shared hegemonic meanings of symbols, common national representations of the past, which could serve as the basis of a common national identity' (Jaskułowski and Surmiak 2015, p. 4). Schools are tools of reproduction of that nationally defined culture. It is good to remember that students learn how to be good members of a nation group not only by memorizing stories about their nation. School system shapes their concept of duties, habits, and attitudes towards nation. It also shows what kind of feelings should be felt – love, devotion or concern. That is the reason why the public education system is perceived as 'social cement' of national community.

Researchers prove that it is possible for schools to socialize members of national community at every turn. The sense of national belonging can be shaped by school decorations (e.g. pictures hanging on the walls), school celebrations, maps, books available in school libraries, and of course – lessons. And again – at every lesson, even at math, it is possible to provide national upbringing (e.g. thanks to accordingly formulated math problems). One has to

admit that it happened mostly in literature, geography, art and – most often – in history lessons (Carretero 2011).

Cajani notices that history lessons were especially important in the 19th-century schools, when nation states were created: 'History, identity and citizenship developed into a strong triad in Europe during the 19th century in the establishment of the nation-states' (Cajani 2007, p. 1). Grand narratives of national histories became 'biographies of nations' passed on to students during that lessons. It was a biography written in a specific way – vaunting own great national deeds, forgetting at the same time about its mistakes and misdeeds. Schoolbooks narrations disseminate 'ethnocentric views and myths, stereotypes and prejudices' (Podeh 2000, p. 68). The memory passed on during those lessons has mainly features of antagonistic memory. Main goals of education of that time were developing national identity in students, love toward their nation and the country, pride of belonging to national community and desire to fight for it against enemies (Cajani 2007, p. 2).

It is a tough task to break up with such a difficult heritage. As researches show school history developed and uses a specific narrations, bearing a strong resemblance to 'nationalistic discourse' descripted by Ruth Wodak (Wodak et al. 1999). Let us mention a few characteristic features of this kind of discourse: nations are depicted as eternal, natural and inescapable entities. Nations are the main agents of history, and actions of particular individuals are described and perceived as action of a member of a nation. In school narrations we can also find particular standards of morality – everything that is good for a nation is morally right, and what harms it, is considered to be bad.

Thanks to history lesson students learn that they belong to a broader community that inhabits a certain place in the world (nation state) and lasts uninterruptedly throughout centuries. They are also taught that they can belong to only one nation, fundamentally different from the others (Careterro 2011).

Another feature of history narration at schools is its selectivity – it shows students the nation's glories, forget about its wrongdoings. It also attempts to create a homogeneous society, silencing alternative and competing memory discourses' (Zembylas and Bekerman 2008, p. 129, Burszta 2018, p. 2).

It is worth to confront theoretical considerations on the existence of nationalism at schools across different countries. It will allow us to see in how many ways links between a state, schooling system, memory and nationalism can be developed in everyday life. Every country realizes its own educational policy, conditioned not only by current events, socioeconomic conditions or membership in international organizations, but also by its history and traditions. It seems that in democratic countries there is a tendency to look in a more favorable way at decentralization of the educational system, growing autonomy of schools and teachers. At the same time politicians and elites more eagerly support multifaced memory narrations that appear at schools. Those are stories told by their potential voters. In Eastern and Central Europe, after the decline of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union one can observe rediscovery and reassertion of national history. School narrations in those countries tend to stress the importance of the nation, that supposed to be homogenic and coherent community.

In the following short fragment I intend to show a few different case studies that show how different relation between nation, state and educational system can be. Of course, it does not cover all types of possible relations. My plan is to take a short glimpse into a variety of possible settings. I would like to start this overview from Australia – a country that tried to re-nationalized its history curriculum. In 2006 a heated public debate concerning history teaching started (Clark 2008). Two main questions can be distinguished in this debate: what is the sense of history lessons and what history narration is supposed to be convey to Australian students? The debate was launched by John Howard, Australian Prime Minister. At that time history lessons were focused mainly on world history and history source analyses. In his opinion that was a mistake and schools were supposed to promote 'Australinness' to the nation's youngest citizens' (Clark 2008, p. 33). He also stressed that lack of history of Australia at schools 'could threaten the future of the nation itself'. It turns out that many Australian intellectuals, historians and journalists supported Howard's point of view. In many interviews and articles they expressed concerned for the future of Australian identity. It was stressed that the education and national identity should be deeply and strongly interlinked. Young Australians should be taught national pride, attachment to national heritage. According to Clark a general agreement was observed that without any

changes in curriculum and school books, the future of the Australian nation was supposed to be at risk (Clark 2008).

A rather different attitude towards memory at schools and nationalism can be observed in Estonia, a country which regained independence in 1990 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Part of the Soviet heritage in Estonia is a Russian minority consisting over 25% of the population. This group consists mainly of descendants of migrants, who came to Estonia during Soviet times. Estonian and Russian memory of the Second World War and the Soviet times differs substantially. That antagonistic memories of the 20th century lead to civil unrests (e.g. Wertsch 2008).

According to Kello and Wagner (2014) the atmosphere concerning history teaching is full of understatements, and the history curriculum is written in an ambiguous way. On the one hand it can be presented outside (e.g. to European institutions) as promoting tolerance and multi-perspectivity. On the other hand it can be also understood as promoting ethnocentricity. Researchers show that according to the state and social expectations teachers should consider themselves agents of the Estonian state, provide students Estonian version of the past and instill patriotism into their students. History teachers working in the Russian schools in Estonia (for Russian minority, with Russian language of instruction) are suspected of being disloyal to the state and teach their students 'incorrect' or even hostile Russian interpretation of the past.

Kello and Wagner made a series of interviews with history teachers of Russian and Estonian identity. The results of their research show that both groups have completely different opinion on their work and state's attitude towards it. According to teachers with Estonian national identity, their main task is to pass on the objective, historical knowledge to their students. In their opinion any connections between schools, curriculum and any ideology (e.g. nationalism) make a negative reference to Soviet times. As they say, working in this way, they realize the state's expectations. At the same time teachers with Russian identity feel much less comfortable concerning their work. First of all, they believe, that they are observed by the state that checks if they educate loyal citizens. They do not see objectivity in educational materials and school books. In their opinion their narration provides Estonian, anti-Russian point of view on the past.

The research conducted by Krzysztof Jaskulowski's team in Poland showed very close relations between school system and nationalism. One of the main aims of history teaching is passing on standardized, homogenous and national narration of the past. In Poland, that is actually a monoethnic country, there are not many problems with counter-narrations of the past by ethnic minorities. Schools, and mainly history lessons, teach youngsters that they are Poles and should be proud of their national heritage.

Jaskulowski made interviews with history teachers asking them, 'what is the main goal of your work?'. For almost all of them it was 'natural and taken for granted' (Jaskułowski and Surmiak, 2015, p. 1) that they should strengthen Polishness of their students, build attachment to the Polish nation and the nation-state. Some of them avoided discussing contentious issues, and focused on glorious events to perform this task better. In Jaskulowski's opinion history teachers in Poland internationalized nationalism so deeply, that they were not able to notice it in their work. Nationalistic narration became and objective history.

When it comes to the research of interlinks between memory, nationalism and school system we can observe domination of curriculum standards and school textbooks analyses. It is impossible to mention all publications dealing with this issue. Researchers from all over the world put in hours to analyze them. So much efforts is put in this area, as school-books are consider to be 'important tools in transmitting 'official' images of nation'. When they are used by thousands of students, they are even called 'state's weapon of mass destruction'. They are mainly analyzed as 'tool of dissemination of the cultural patterns models that the social power holders wish to spread' (Kosi 2018, p. 2). They are tools used by the state to provide students with the same set of stories that are considered to be true and objective. The examination system ought to guarantee that narrations they consist of will be memorized and internalized by students.

Most often researchers analyze school-books' narrations. It seems that most of all they are interested in the way different social groups are depicted. They analyze how the ingroup is presented, what the images of different kinds of outgroups are (e.g. Andersson 2010, Kosi 2018, Morgan 2005), and what the relationship between them are (e.g. Podeh 2000). They

observe the way of presenting social phenomena like progress, feminism or nation (e.g. Lazarević 2013). Changes in the narrations are also described. Much effort has been put in to comparing narrations of similar issues present in different schoolbooks from different countries.

Iconographic materials that can be found in different kinds of educational aids are also analyzed. When it comes to history teaching much has been said of the maps contained in atlases and schoolbooks. Researchers show, how powerful effect they have on e.g. student's image of the territory and features of their country and its neighbors (e.g. Black 1997, Kamusella 2010). Kamusella proves, that maps in Polish atlases show Poland (does not matter it concerns 10th or 20th centuries) as the monoethnic country, inhabited only by Poles.

There is, however, a group of researchers, who try to prove, that relying only on analyzes of textbooks and curricula cannot give us a proper insight into relationship between schools, memory and nationalism. They stress that looking from schoolbook's point of view we are offered rather a superficial picture of situation at schools. In this perspective researchers emphasize active position of teachers, who are perceived as 'memory makers' (Kansteiner 2002, p. 197). They are treated not as 'passive textbook users' (Jaskułowski, Majewski and Surmiak 2017, p. 3), but as active, thoughtful agents, who modify and interpret official state narrations. Looking from this perspective we can see that schools do not educate children using only written materials. Extremely important are also teachers' efforts and stories they tell students.

One must admit that researches on teachers are far less common than on schoolbooks. I have found several studies based on interviews conducted with teachers. The main topic of those talks was teacher's perception of their work (e.g. Jaskulowski, Majewski and Surmiak 2017, Jaskułowski and Surmiak 2015, Kello and Wagner 2014, Akinoglu 2009). Occasionally we can also find analyses of lesson observations (e.g. Hawkey and Prior 2011, Christou 2007).

It seems that even less commonly conducted at schools are researches on phenomena, that Michael Billig called 'banal nationalism' (Billig 1995) – everyday practices, which build and solidify a sense of national belonging and identity. Although they are part of school

everyday life, let's mention only about oaths to the flag or the celebration of patriotic holidays, analyzes of them are rather rare. Researches based on methodology of classroom ethnography are used mainly as a background for description of another issue connected with nationalism or memory (Christou 2007).

Looking over different kinds of research on the topic of memory and nationalism, we must not forget about another important agent – students. There are many quantitative and qualitative studies on the shape of their social memory, ways and means it is constructed. They raise also an issue of students' national identification (Barton, McCully, Conway 2003), show their attitude towards different narrations of the past present at schools (e.g. Audigier 2005). However, it is very often stressed, how difficult it is to interpret results of those researches, when we want to learn about the efficiency of school education. Although school system tends to have an ambition to be the only one source of knowledge for younger populations, it is impossible to achieve. Their identity and social memory is also shaped by another media – e.g. family or mass media. That raises another question – what do we learn about schools asking youngsters about their vision of the past or sense of belonging?

There are very few researches showing that school education has little effect on a sense of national identity at all. Ann Low-Beer, analyzing history teaching in Scotland, states: 'In Scotland several articles have shown that there has been very little teaching of Scottish history in schools. Yet, despite this, a sense of Scottish national and cultural identity has grown apace' (Low-Beer 2003, p. 5). One can make the same remark on the Soviet school system. After several decades of constructing 'homo sovieticus' featured by 'soviet patriotism' (Heller 1988) in the 80's was observed a fervent rebirth of national feelings in the whole country – one of the reasons of collapsing of the Soviet State.

Another perspective of looking at the school system is discourse analysis. It is focused on the issues of social perception of its aims, expectations of its role in building national identity of younger generation. Ann Clark scrutinized debate concerning re-nationalization history teaching in Australia (Clark 2008). She was interested in politicians' speeches, interviews with intellectuals and historians.

Researchers involved in issues concerning the relationship between school system, memory and nationalism have several ideas of how to overcome this closeness, perceived as negative and even dangerous for contemporary societies. In the following paragraphs I elaborate a few ideas referring mainly to history teaching.

According to Luigi Cajani one of the biggest problem of school narration concerning the past is that it divides people into 'us' and 'them', ingroup and outgroups, my nation vs other nations. In his opinion it is one of the main sources of ethnocentrism in Europe. Even if we stop thinking in the narrow way, using categories shaped by nation states and start thinking more broadly, consider ourselves as Europeans it will not solve the problem completely. It will lead us straight to Eurocentrism, where 'we' means Europe, and 'they' – the rest of the world. He proposes to overcome the problem of different 'centrisms' and adopt 'a view from the moon' – 'shifting the focus from the ethnic or cultural group to humanity as a whole' (Cajani 2007, p. 5). In this perspective the whole humankind would be the ingroup, what would involve writing common schoolbooks for everyone.

It seems that there are less revolutionary and more feasible attempts to make schoolbooks less nationalistic, more open to dialogue with another groups' narrations. Thanks to efforts by UNESCO, Council of Europe and Georg-Eckert-Institut in Braunschweig (Germany) several textbooks commissions were founded in the second half of the 20th century. There are organized meetings of researchers, teachers and intellectuals coming from two or more countries are, where contentious issues are put into discussions. In Poland there are organized meetings with representatives of all neighbor-countries, and their discussions have some impact on schoolbooks used in Polish schools. Many European institutions e.g. Georg-Eckert-Institute also organize workshops and conferences for teachers, where they are trained how to conduct history lessons free from nationalism.

Another way of dealing with nationalistic narrations and antagonistic memories in schoolbooks are common educational materials prepared by specialist from two or more countries, very often 'former enemies' or between countries where there were border 'disputes'. For example, German-Polish cooperation resulted in common history schoolbook

'Europa. Nasza historia' – 'Europa. Unsere Geshichte'[1]. Similar initiatives are also organized in Asian countries. Historians from Japan, South Korea and the People's Republic of China wrote common textbook (though it was not acknowledged by any country) dealing with the history of this region in 19th and 20th centuries (Cajani 2007, p. 5).

There are many researchers who try to deal with problems of nationalism and antagonistic memories in history textbooks from a completely different perspective (e.g. Kello and Wagner 2014, Clark 2008, Low-Beer 2003). They show that history's main contribution in education of citizens of democratic countries is the skill of critical thinking. As Anna Clark suggests: 'History's worth in a liberal democracy lies in its capacity to develop critical thinking' (Clark 2008, p. 37). It is stressed that contemporary schools ought to enhance also students' skills in critical and analytical thinking, drawing conclusions and independence in the process of gaining knowledge (Low-Beer 2003, p. 6). Schools are expected to develop students' independence, inwardness and critical thinking.

Stress that is put on the importance of developing critical thinking in education is connected with a change in perception of school tasks and with a different approach to teaching. Students are encouraged not to memorize information, but to work with it and looking at it from different perspectives. Thus teachers are not perceived as leaders, sources of objective, true knowledge any more, but they become the students' guides and helpers. Thanks to the shift in teaching history it is possible to go beyond 'parochial national knowledge'.

Peter Seixas and Sam Wineburg are the authors of 'historical literacy'. In their opinion school history should be thought like 'scientific' history at universities. They must not tell univocal story of the past, but show its complexity. They also stress that history should not be 'known', but ought to be understood. At the same time schools should teach youngsters 'critical engagement, understanding why historical interpretations differ, and reconciling the values of the past with the present' (Clark 2008, p. 38).

To conclude the analysis of history teaching in an education system is good to think about interrelationship between emotions and modes in which we remember the past. It is easy to

[1] For images of this book, see : https://www.dw.com/pl/polsko-niemiecki-podr%C4%99cznik-do-nauczania-historii-ogromna-szansa/a-42793918)

find characteristic features of an antagonistic way of remembering in the 19th-centry, nation-centered narrations – e.g. it divides in a Manichean way the historical characters into good and evil (Bull and Hansen, 2015, 1). 'Our group', meant as an our nation is depicted most often as a positive character, whereas other nations are 'they' – suspected, and potentially bad. The ways of avoiding antagonistic mode of history were described. The first way is to change the way students are taught perceive 'the our group'. The boundaries of 'our group' are widening whereas 'other group' is shrinking. The second way is to change the way history is used as a school subject. As many academics and practitioners underline it should develop student's skills of critical thinking. Reading about different ideas of changing the way history is taught at schools it is useful to remember about a reform conducted in Spain in the 20th century. The attempt was made to write a new history curriculum and build student identity around the idea of legal framework that respects different cultures and individual rights. We can find in Spanish reforms features of cosmopolitan mode of remembering – 'emphasise the human suffering of past atrocities and human rights violations and represents *good* and *evil* in abstract terms' (Bull and Hansen, 2015, 2). Eventually the reform was not a full success. School history was perceived as 'too cold': emotionless, indifferent, alien and thus irrelevant (Careterro 2011).

In my opinion the failure of the reform is symptomatic and reveals a very interesting feature of a cosmopolitan mode of remembering. History based on abstract concepts, without any connections with student's emotions becomes irrelevant and useless. The need to find an identity in the past seems to be so strong, that only a certain type of narrations that can give a sense of belonging and stir emotions are alluring and interesting. Most likely the great success of neo-nationalistic, populistic narrations (Bull and Hansen, 2015, 2) using the antagonistic mode of remembering owes to play with emotions.

It is a good idea to ask if there is the third way between the abovementioned modes of memory. Anna Cento Bull and Hans L. Hansen (2015) propose an idea of agonistic mode of remembering. The elements of an agonistic mode of history would give school history the possibility of avoiding the heat of antagonistic mode of memory and cold of the cosmopolitan mode of remembering. A dialogue-based antagonistic way of remembering seems to be a good idea. Giving the voice to different narrations, very often contradict each

other and give the possibility to understand different points of view, develop skills of critical thinking and do not suppress students' views and opinions. In conclusion it seems important to ask another question, if contemporary schools are ready for agonistic history teaching?

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The Politics of Remembering – Ammar Ali Jan

In this section Ammar Ali Jan (Assistant Professor, Forman Christian College, Pakistan) explores how the study of 'history' has evolved alongside notions of the 'nation state'. In turn, reactions against this by historians to make 'ordinary people' the subject of historical processes, demonstrates how memory is central in this battle ground. Through the case study of partition in 1947 between India and Pakistan, Ammar discusses how the processes of forgetting and 'silencing' are also crucial when engaging with memory.

Memory studies has emerged as a major discipline over the past few decades. The discipline points to a larger tension within the realm of modern social sciences in relation to the study of the past. The modern study of "History" is a specific way of relating the past to the present. Leopold Von Ranke (1981) was perhaps the most prolific and influential thinker who worked on methodological challenges in writing the history of any particular subject.

Apart from emphasizing coherent narratives based on evidence, the Rankean notion of history also seeks to compartmentalize time into neat categories of the past, present and future. This maneuver permitted historians to construct linear narratives of historical events but placed them in sharp contrast to more popular ways of remembering the past. These includes myths, folklore, poetry, literature and other methods through which the past is remembered in the present. Yet, these forms of remembering do not create a rigid distinction between the past and the present, as the past perpetually seeps into the present in order to reshape the latter.

If we look at the study of past undertaken by historians, we can make a broad distinction with the ahistorical imaginings of the past. If popular memory allowed for a movement of time that was interlaced with elements of the past, present and future, historical narratives had to be made "objective" by teasing out the past from the present. In other words, popular memory was confronted with the "disciplined memory" constructed by the historian through a careful study of the past. The age of the archive was born (Hobsbawm, 1998).

While objectivity was one of the primary goals of this new form of remembering, soon it became increasingly evident that the discipline of history itself could not extricate itself from the historical context in which it came into existence. This context was shaped by the emergence of the nation-state that required a disciplining of popular memory in order to impose a national identity on a disparate population (Chatterjee, 1994). This political project required a homogenization of the past in which historical events could be narrated in a linear trajectory that ends with the realization of the nation-state. History, which appeared to be "objective", now lost its innocence as it was deemed to be manipulating the past to serve a concrete political project (Guha, 2003).

The imbrication of history with state power led major debates on methodology among historians. British historians such as E.P. Thompson (1966) and Eric Hobsbawm (1998) developed the notion of "History from below". They aimed to decenter national histories in order to make ordinary people the subject of historical processes through a methodology that focused on quotidian forms to resistance to understand major events from the past. Their interventions turned History into an overt battleground for shaping memory, further diminishing claims of history to represent an objective view of the past.

Memory Studies

Such debates have placed memory as the central theme in history writing. This begs the question; is memory itself a force in history? Or to put it differently, can memory of the past play a role in shaping the past, present and future of society? And finally, what does the recognition of memory's importance do to History as a subject which posited itself in contrast to popular memory?

Perhaps the biggest catalyst towards memory studies was an interrogation of the tragedy of the Holocaust. The problem arose with the lack of conventional evidence to match the scale of crimes and barbarity experienced during the genocide of Jewish people in Europe. The fact that it was difficult to find an official archive of the events meant that the legal as well

as historical records had to rely on witness testimony, foregrounding affect as a major component of history and memory (Hirsch and Spitzer, 2009). The issue became more complicated by debates on the political import of this memory to ensure that such catastrophes are no longer repeated by nation-states.

James E. Young's work on the Holocaust shows the ways in which the past continues to be weaved into the present through the work of memory (1994). In particular, his work on monuments and public art show how objects related to the past are invested with a power to both reflect past events but become political symbols within the present. This work has been further developed by historian of India, Chris Moffat, who shows how monuments dedicated to anti-colonial activists become sites for political claim-making in contemporary India (2019).

What is at stake is not only the details of the past, but also the ways in which memory itself becomes an agent of history. Yet, such an approach produces a dilemma for historians who believed in creating a disciplined memory were confronted with myths and oral history in place of the archive, and affective attachments in place of official documents. Not only is the importance of popular stories and actions become integral to history writing, but also the hitherto ignored questions of silence, forgetting and trauma became major issues in engaging with memory. In other words, there was increasing borrowing from anthropology and psychology as historians and political scientists attempted to deal with the problem of popular memory.

Capitalism, Memory and History

The turn towards memory studies has led an intersection between history, theory and psychoanalysis. Perhaps one the earliest manifestations of this trend can be seen in the works of the Frankfurt School that aimed to combine Marxist theory with Freudian analyses. Ernst Bloch, one of the pioneering members of the schools, argued that modernity desires a homogenous, linear time for the present. Yet, the present remains haunted by vestiges from the past that continue to interrupt the perpetuation of the present (1995). Bloch criticized

the Left for failing to grasp that the hyper-rationalism of modernism is unable to connect to the dreams of the past that are conjured up by subaltern classes in the present. The victory of the fascists was partly a result of their ability to mobilize these latent "pre-modern" sentiments and turning them into a terrifying political project (Bloch, 1995).

This idea was further developed by Walter Benjamin who asserted that the dreams of the past had a subterranean presence in the present. This presence of the past made any clear distinction between the past and the present difficult, as the past could be mobilized to overthrow the existing rationality of the capitalist system. Reason was then not on the side of linear progress, but on the side of those who could disrupt this alleged "progress" by remembering the alternative paths foreclosed by the onslaught of capitalism (Benjamin, 1995).

One can argue that memory remained central to Marxist thinking since the publication of Das Kapital. In the book, Marx discusses the problem of primitive accumulation as a process of loot and plunder that opened the possibility of capitalist social relations. Yet, Capital wipes out this history from popular memory in order to make commodity exchange the natural state of human affairs (2010). This erasure of memory is central to the commodity fetishism characteristic of capitalist society, where the loop of production and consumption prevents access to a past (and present) of violent dispossession.
Therefore, repression of memory remains a central feature of modernity both for the homogenizing tendency of nation-states as well as the fetishism of the commodity. In such a situation of erasure, remembering becomes an important tool for challenging the status quo and for asserting erased identity. To that extent, one can argue that battles over controlling and remembering the past are at the heart of modernity.

Discussion from Indian historiography

The Indian sub-continent has seen contestation over memory as an integral part of forming national identity. One of the main reasons for this conflict was the excessive anxiety of

creating a national identity on a region that contained a multiplicity of religions, languages and ethnicities. To discipline these disparate histories into a homogenous "national" narrative required discursive violence which often turned into physical violence among different communities. Perhaps the most spectacular example of the violent potential of these contesting memories can be viewed in the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims, a conflict that has led to repeated violence including the infamous riots during the partition of 1947.

One of the disturbing elements of the 1947 violence was that despite mass killings and abductions, the events have not been officially memorialized (Kapila, 2010). This led many scholars to engage with the question of silence and forgetting as productive processes that play a role in identity formation. For example, the basis of Pakistani and Indian national identity is premised on the originary violence of 1947, when the ambiguous divide between Hindus and Muslims was cemented through unprecedented communal violence. In that sense, this violence was generative of the nation-states who could claim legitimacy by pointing towards the impossibility of communal harmony by referring to this event.

Yet the scale of violence meant that this originary event had to be disavowed by the newly created nation-states. Urvashi Butalia's (2000) work on the survivors of the partition violence showed how "silence" was one of the most important coping mechanisms of women who survived abductions and rape. Many were living with their former abductors and had converted to their rapist/husband's religion. The silence and shame associated with individual families was also reflected in the state's relation to the events of partition, as female bodies were often equated with national honor that had been allegedly defiled.

For this reason, there are no monuments or memorials for the victims of partition violence. Instead, there is a generalized silence that allows for the perpetuation of national identity without acknowledging the violence that cemented it. Such silencing has again compelled historians to enter the realm of psychology to see how certain events are remembered, forgotten or disavowed in order to build local communities in the present. For example,

Gyan Pandey's work titled "Remembering Partition" shows how certain aspects of the violence of the partition are highlighted while others are emphasized to construct feelings of communal belonging. He also critiques nationalist historiography for its claims to neutrality even while it indulges in rewriting the past to fit the myth of an eternal, homogenous Indian nation (Pandey, 2002).

The recurrent communal violence has also led to discussions on the place of trauma in history. Indeed, the reason for Hindu mobilization against the Babri mosque in 1992 was that it was allegedly built at the site of a temple destroyed by Muslim invaders. Thus, the destruction of the mosque by Hindu mobs and the subsequent killings of hundreds of Muslims was justified in the name of the historical trauma felt by Hindus for their violent subjugation at the hands of Muslim invaders. This episode led to debate among historians on whether collective trauma can be sustained over generations and be activated in the present (Pandey, 1994). Such debates have also taken place in the context of slavery in the United States, where psychologists are working with historians to see whether trauma can be transferred over generations.

One of the classic works in this genre in the Indian sub-continent is by Romila Tharpar (2005) who investigates the case of temple razing in the 16th century by the Muslim king Babur and trace the history of trauma around this event. In her study, Tharpar shows that there was no historical memory of trauma associated with the events among Hindus. This changed in the mid-19th century when the British seized upon this marginal event and publicized it throughout India to mobilize Hindu sentiment in favor of their war efforts in Afghanistan (Babur entered India through Afghanistan).

This story was later picked by Hindu reformers who were looking to consolidate their community through stories of collective suffering. The trauma from this 16th century event appears in public discussion in the late 19th century and becomes a national issue only at the end of the 20th century (Tharpar, 2005). In other words, this was a case of manufactured trauma that was produced and deployed in order to intervene in existing conflicts.

Therefore, much like personal memory, collective memory is open for manipulation, where the elements of highlighting and underemphasizing certain events, inducing silence or creating phantoms from the past in order to confront the battles in the present.

It is such contestation over methodology, history and memory that propelled the formation of the Subaltern Studies School in India. The claim of this group of scholars was that history writing remained an elite affair that did not center the people in their analysis. In this sense, they were close to People's History project in Great Britain led by E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawn. Yet, they made a stronger intervention on methodology by claiming that non-European history could not be grasped without engaging with the multiple temporalities that characterize it and the concomitant imaginaries that proliferate the public sphere (Guha, 2010).

In his essay titled "The Public Life of History: An Argument from India", Dipesh Chakrabarty examines the ways in which history becomes embroiled in debates about representation in postcolonial India. Instead of a neutral and objective belief in history, different caste and ethnic groups claimed that anyone unaffiliated to their community had no right to record their history. In other words, history writing became an avenue to engage in producing specific memories that can intervene in contemporary conflicts, as well as right historical wrongs from the past (Chakrabarty, 2008). In this way, history no longer remained a discipline contained at the site of the university, but was immediately implicated in social and political battles. In this sense, history could not rise above the historically sedimented conflicts in society, but had to respond to the demands imposed by these struggles in the present.

Subaltern Studies has also allowed us to rethink the consciousness of ordinary people away from its depictions in the archive. For example, both Indian nationalist historiography and colonial writings depicted Indians devotion to Gandhi as irrational and backwards. The trope of backwardness was used by colonial powers to prevent indigenous rule, but it was also used by nationalist elites to use high-handed tactics against subaltern resistance in

postcolonial India. Yet, Subalternists such as Shahid Amin (1995) demonstrated how beyond the veneer of simplicity, the peasants of India were reinventing the image of Gandhi to grasp the social world they inhabited and prepare a fight against it.

For example, while Gandhi had little to say on the forceful overthrow of land relations, the peasantry developed myths about Gandhi's decision to abolish landlordism and usury. They also spread myths suggesting that Gandhi had permitted the use of violence against colonial officials, a stark contrast to Gandhi's official position of non-violence (Amin, 1995). Similarly, Chris Moffat has studied how the image of another revolutionary figure, Bhagat Singh, is conjured up by groups as different as liberals, communists, and Hindu/Sikh extremists for political claim-making in the present. What is at stake is not always a separation of myth from facts, but the development of a narrative that can aid in battles in the present, a move that cements tension between objective history and the exigencies of politics (Moffat, 2019).

Conclusion: Agonism and the Way Forward

This discussion brings us to the framework of our research set up by Anna Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen (2016). In their remarkable essay on the subject, they compare antagonistic and cosmopolitan forms of memory. An antagonistic form of remembering the past requires the presence of permanent division between enemies and friends, a form that lends itself to nationalist, chauvinist and even fascist forms of politics. The Hindu-Muslim divide discussed above is characteristic of an antagonistic form of memory that fixes an enemy in history, leading to deadly clashes between the two communities.

On the other hand, the cosmopolitan form of remembering aims to counter this tendency by claiming a multiplicity of experiences and celebrating them in a culturally diverse society. Yet, such emphasis on multiculturalism does not take into account the divisions and antagonisms that shape any political conjuncture and opens itself to criticism from those opposing a stifling status quo. Inadvertently, cosmopolitanism appears to be a conservative

form of thinking that does represses social contradictions and the possibility of conflict and change.

Agonism aims to bridge this divide by allowing for the possibility of conflict without fixing the lines between friend and enemies. The contingent and fluid nature of political contestation means that political and ideological battles would not be repressed in the name of harmonious whole under the name of "humanity" or "Europe." On the other hand, it allows for the perpetual reconstitution of political identities based on ideological demarcations within a conjuncture, rather than a permanent division among historically determined communal affiliations.

The task of relating memory to conflict is then two-fold. First, how do we read the history of conflict without making conflicting identities permanent? Second, how do we accept the antagonisms of the present while studying the past without succumbing to the temptation of fixing the past through the lens of the present? Agonism opens the possibility of navigating this complex terrain while proposing forms of remembering that can further the cause of social justice while avoiding an antagonistic approach to historically sedimented conflicts. What is at stake is not only politics, but also the way we conceive history in the modern world.

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Nations, Gender and Memory - Sophie Whiting

In setting out the key debates across the feminist literature on state building and violent conflict, Sophie Whiting (Senior Lecturer, University of Bath) considers the relationship between memory and gender within nationalist projects. This section goes on to ask whether an agonistic approach to memory in embracing multi-perspectivity can help to move beyond constructions of women as 'passive victims' and award agency by acknowledging the various roles they play in conflict and peace building. Finally, Sophie argues how it is also crucial to consider appropriate methodologies, as women's experiences of past conflict are often found in the silences rather than the history books, state narratives, public commemorative spaces and dominant discourses.

A gendered analysis is central to understanding the use of the past in supporting, and challenging, nation states and nationalist projects. Navigating these dynamics requires a discussion of the literature that spans the fields of memory studies, international relations and peace and conflict studies. Within this parameter, the discussion below explores the gendered narratives of state-building (Hall, 1993; Nagel, 1998), the reproduction of public/private spheres though state lead discourse and policy (Peterson, 1994; Yuval-Davis, 1993), the role of 'motherhood' in nationalist projects (Abu-Duhou, 2003; Handrahan, 2004; Jad, 2011), the use of women's bodies as spaces for violence (Ali, 2009), women's support/resistance to national projects (Enloe, 1987; Vickers, 2006) and the reproduction of essentialist gender roles through commemorative practices (Jacobs, 2016; McDowell, 2008).

Until the early 1990s there was little research that analysed the dynamics between gender relations and nationalist projects. Traditional scholarship on states, citizenship, revolution and empire are accused by feminist scholars of suffering from gender blindness at best, or, at worst, the erasure of the role of women in the making of nations and nation states (Enloe, 2014; Hall, 1993; Nagel, 1998; Peterson, 1994, 2013; Yuval-Davis, 1993).

In traditional scholarship, the notion of state citizenship was constructed around the discourse of the 'rights of man' and 'fraternity of men' (Pateman, 1988). For example, Benedict Anderson describes how the 'nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two

centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings' (Anderson, 1991, p. 2). Such male defined comradery used to shape and maintain nations and nationalism was sustained through the structures of the state and the public sphere. For feminist scholars, the common discourse placing women as 'mother of the nation', an image which rests on female reproductive capacity in support of the nation, reinforced their position within the private sphere. It is this public / private dichotomy between nation (female) and state (masculine), that is revealing of why women have been further removed from the public arena and positions of political power (Hall, 1993).

Hall describes how national identities draw on a 'repertoire of traditions, myths and representations which are constantly reworked and rearticulated to different national projects' (1993, p. 99). Whilst women have historically been under-represented within the state apparatus and intelligentsia, they are described as being central to rediscovering 'collective memories' of a mythical or historical past that becomes the basis of nationalist aspirations (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Women are therefore not absent from the making or unmaking of the nation state, but the primary roles are awarded to, and written by men whilst women are the 'supporting actors' (Enloe, 2014). As described by Nagel, these 'roles' are played out in numerous ways;

> through the construction of patriotic manhood and exalted motherhood as icons of nationalist ideology; through the designation of gendered 'places' for men and women in national politics; through the domination of masculine interests and ideology in nationalist movements; through the interplay between masculine microcultures and nationalist ideology; through sexualized militarism including the construction of simultaneously over-sexed and under-sexed 'enemy' men (rapists and wimps) and promiscuous 'enemy' women (sluts and whores). (Nagel, 1998, p. 242)

The fall of communism brought questions of 'national identity', and what it meant, centre stage. Yet the role gender played in nationalist projects and nation building remained absent and insufficiently studied in mainstream analysis (Hall, 1993; Peterson, 1994). Feminist

scholars looked to address this by highlighting the participation of women in national and opposition movements and researching the mechanisms and structures intended to exclude women from political institutions and decision-making processes (Nagel, 1998, p. 243).

The gendered analysis of nationalism and nation states that emerged in the 1990s placed a focus on nations as gendered institutions, where through nationalist projects patriarchal social relations are formed and reproduced (Vickers, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Nation states therefore provide a structure, or what Connell (2003) refers to as 'gendered regimes', in which social relations can be institutionalised and reinforced. Within ethnically and culturally divided contexts, gendered constructions of femininity and masculinity are reinforced by different nationalist identities, their relationship to the state and proximity to power. Gender is therefore a powerful vehicle in defining the boundaries of the group to which one feels loyal, as Peterson explains;

> The gender hierarchy of masculine over feminine, and the nationalist domination of insiders over outsiders, are doubly linked. Nationalism is gendered in how the construction of group identity (allegiance to "us" versus "them") depends upon divisions of masculinity and femininity. (Peterson, 1994, p. 83)

Nation states therefore, provide a system of power relations in which ethno-national and gender identities are mutually constituted and reinforced (Ashe & McCluskey, 2015; Racioppi & O' Sullivan See, 2001). Gender becomes entwined within antagonistic constructions of 'us' and 'them' and therefore central to the analysis of memory across disputed territories.

Further exploration of the ways in which nation-states represent gendered institutions requires a discussion around the policies and discourses that help sustain these structures. Peterson (1994) refers to these strategies as the 'battle of the cradle' (over women's sexual reproduction) and a 'battle of the nursery' (over identities and loyalties), both of which are discussed further in turn below.

First, the 'battle of the cradle' refers to the oversight placed on women's biological reproduction and producers of 'national stocks' (Peterson, 1994; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Such

regulation exists through pro-natalist policies (restricting contraceptive knowledge and techniques, child care, denying abortions, and incentivising reproduction through material rewards) as well as the control over birth rates of 'other' groups (such as abortion, compulsory contraception and sterilisation) (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989; Peterson, 1994; Yuval-Davis, 1997).

It is important to note that women are not passive in what Yuval-Davis refers to as 'national/biological warfare', women are also active participants by implementing the policies or sharing in the ideologies that control other women (1997). There are also circumstances where motherhood is considered as an active form of resistance. Abu-Duhou's research on motherhood in Palestine argues how the construction of women as the national producers needs to be viewed in the context of perpetual threat of war and conflict. Within this context, motherhood is framed and celebrated in the political and cultural texts, 'but only the right kind of mother is socially and nationally validated – the mother who can bear sons for the revolution' (Abu-Duhou, 2003, p. 85). In this context, motherhood becomes something more complex than the control over reproductive rights and becomes an act of defiance awarded agency.

Second, the 'battle of the nursery' describes how cultural transmission occurs through women (as primary care givers) to the next generation (Peterson, 1994). This strategy also describes how women provide symbolic markers as social and cultural identities through images, ritual and myth (McClintock 1991; Skurski 1994). Peterson goes on to describes how during the construction and reinforcement of a national or group cultural loyalty 'the metaphors of nation-as-woman and woman-as-nation suggest how women, as bodies and cultural repositories, become the battleground of group struggles' (Peterson, 1994, p. 79). Within these conflicts, a common discourse around the rape of women and territory emerges.

The rape of the body or nation not only disrupts territorial borders but the reproductive capacity of the community and land. For example, within the Palestinian national discourse

celebrating the fertile mother raising the next generation of soldiers for the revolution (Abu-Duhou, 2003), Palestine is also represented as an honourable woman whose honour was tarnished by the Zionist settlers in 1948 (Hall, 1993; Nagel, 1998). If the nation/woman cannot be protected against rape, then all rights to the land/body have been lost. This conflation of sexual violence and territory denies women agency in their own right, as they become instruments of male agendas and possession needing protection, thus, 'the motherland is female but the state and its citizen-warriors are male' (Peterson, 1994, p. 80).

These symbolic representations of women that are denied agency is reflected within the memory studies literature concerned with gendered representations of trauma and conflict. For example, women's experiences are recalled through the gendered narratives of the past that reinforce traditional stereotypes of women as suffering mothers as a symbol of sacrifice and martyrdom or sexual possessions of the perpetrators (Baumel, 1998; Eschebach, 2003). Women's involvement in resistance movements, insurgencies, civil society or political organisations are commonly erased at the expense of providing symbolic representations of nationhood or narratives of victimisation. In her research based on the Holocaust and violence surrounding the conflict in Bosnia, Jacobs demonstrates the contradiction that whilst female victims represent universal symbols of human tragedy there is also deliberate erasure of female narratives from public consciousness (Jacobs, 2008, 2016). For example, the rebuilding of ethno-nationalist identities in Bosnia centred on the gendered narratives of widowhood and maternal suffering whilst the trauma of rape has been supressed. Women therefore come to symbolise a particular kind of survivor, representing family and domesticity.

The presentation of women as symbolic of national honour and narratives concerning the defence of the mother-land are common themes during processes of nation building. The erasure or reinterpretation of the past to fit within these narratives presents a challenge for scholars to rediscover these 'silent voices'. The partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, which is described as such as huge event that it provides the pivot around which memories have been constructed (Butalia, 1997), offers insight into these challenges.

Whilst official records of partition reflect upon the constitutional history and political actors involved, the task of unearthing the history of women and lower castes, and what they went through both sides of the border, is more difficult. Estimates suggest that between twelve to fifteen million people moved across the newly demarcated boundaries in 1947 with around two million dying of malnutrition, disease and inter communal violence (Ali, 2009). Partition is also described as a deeply gendered process, which saw 75,000-120,000 women raped and abducted as well as being sold in to slavery and prostitution (Mohanram, 2019).

These histories that recount violence of partition that took place between communities, make little reference to the familial violence perpetrated by men towards women of their own community (Butalia, 1997). During the violence and mass displacement of people that accompanied partition, there was a fear of forced religious conversion. Whilst it was perceived that men had the physical and mental strength to resist or escape, women did not. Such vulnerability placed women in the category of passive subjects who needed to be saved. Published half a decade after partition, Butalia's (2000) collection of oral histories reflecting on this time, recalls incidences of women being killed by their families or taking their own lives, in both cases being viewed as martyrs for carrying out 'their duty' to save the purity of their race and religion 'from being diluted'.

In addition, women who ended up on the 'wrong side' of the border due to the violence that accompanied partition, over time married and had children with men of 'the other' community. Throughout the process of 'reclaiming' these women, their bodies and their purity, became of great importance to the community and the legitimacy of the state (Butalia, 1997, p. 104). Due to concern surrounding non acceptance and being perceived as 'soiled', women have been understandably reluctant to share their experiences. As a result, these histories become buried and removed from the official state building narrative (Ali, 2009). Mohanram (2019) describes how the amnesia surrounding the violence of partition permeates through history to explain more recent incidences of sexual violence and the state's reaction to them;

> In partition rapes, the politicisation of sexual violence was moved to the zone of the private by the government, the law, the families and the archive itself. In 2012, women's sexuality and sexual violence are again relegated to the private, untouched by the law or any form of justice.

The lack of agency awarded to women through gendered narratives of the past and the amnesia often surrounding these experiences, continue to reinforce gendered power struggles in the present.

The example of partition demonstrates that through narratives, myths and traditions that support the memory of conflict, women appear, as Enloe suggests, only as 'an offstage chorus to a basically male drama' (1987, p. 259). Where women do appear, the parts they play are often symbolic and removed of agency. For example, research on the public performance of memory in Northern Ireland demonstrates how the commemorative landscape reinforces male privilege and power. The years following the Northern Ireland peace process saw a huge rise in commemorations, plaques and murals across streetscape as communities competed for representation of their respective experiences and interpretation of the conflict (Graham & Whelan, 2007; Rolston, 2012). These commemorations of conflict provide a stage for the performance of tribal politics and contestation between communities as well as demonstrate contemporary gendered power struggles. The claiming of space through memorialisation, not only constitutes a 'war by other means' but reproduces the wartime gender order (McDowell & Braniff, 2014). The cultural landscape therefore 'reinscribes gendered narratives of the past (and present) where the multiple experiences of women in Northern Ireland continue to be either obscured or male defined' (McDowell, 2008, p. 338). Therefore, whilst it is important to consider the gendered imagery within these commemorative spaces, particularly how they are used to shape and depict different national projects, it is also necessary to unpick the power structures behind such spaces. For example, despite gender equality being enshrined within the 1998 peace agreement Rolston argues 'it is the paramilitary men who decide who, what, where and when to commemorate'

(2018, p. 340). A gender lens of memory is therefore useful in revealing the structures behind memorialisation.

In unravelling the relationship between memory, gender and nation, it is also important to consider how gender intersects with other social divisions such as class, ethnicity, sexuality and age. Similarly, nationalist projects differ in terms of their inclusion of women. For example, Western neo liberal democracy required different relationships between the nation state and gender than anticolonial or settler-dominated imperial contexts (Vickers 2002). In post-colonial contexts, the constructions of gender / nation faces different dynamics. In European nationalist discourses, it was always European white masculinity that defined nationalist agency. In the colonial context, it was also the same white masculinity, which was able to reign supreme in controlling the colonised (Mohanty, 1991). In adapting European nationalist thought to local conditions, Massad points out how 'anti-colonial nationalists were faced with the task of defining not only the roles of men and women in the nationalist project, but also what a non-European nationalist masculinity would look like' (1995, p. 477). Exploring these hierarchies associated with identity and belonging also questions how we think of nation states and borders. Whilst borders exist as spatial boundaries between and within nation states, they also represent lines of inclusion and exclusion which can be experienced differently depending on class, ethnicity, sexuality and gender, and also how these factors intersect.

The role of diaspora communities and their relationship with the nation state also expands our conceptualisation of borders beyond territorial boundaries. For example, how gender ideologies can be used to reinforce the structural interdependence between nation states and diaspora communities. Through the case study of Singapore's 'go-regional' policy Yeoh and Willis (1999) argue that state-vaunted divisions of labour have been transnationalised to further entrench the gendering of diasporic workplaces, and the construction of women-in-diaspora as 'moral wives'. In such cases, the nation state is able to articulate gendered ideologies that transcend national borders and appropriate transnational space.

In surveying the dynamics between gender and the management of contested memories it is also useful to explore the literature within the field of peace and conflict studies. Feminist research on gender and conflict critiques the essentialist notions of gender which presents women as the biological and cultural reproducers of the nation in need of protecting, whilst men serve as the warriors and saviours of the nation (Muftić & Collins, 2014; Steans, 2013). When women do cross these distinct gendered lines and engage in violence, they are constructed as flawed, imperfect, and pathologically damaged (Sjoberg, 2007). Hegemonic masculinity, on the other hand, which is superior to femininity as well as other constructs of masculinity, is praised for possessing strong, rational, and competitive characteristics, and is encouraged through various institutions, such as the military (Enloe, 2014). In terms of conflict resolution, such essentialist narratives fail to acknowledge the role some women play in the continuation of conflict and the roles some men assume in its resolution (Side, 2015).

Violence in the early 1990s, such as that seen in Bosnia and Rwanda, focused attention on women's experience of conflict. Characterised by mass rape and genocide, these conflicts resulted in the international community's greater willingness to recognise global gender inequality and make moves to support the inclusion of women in peace building. Adopted in 2000, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, and the wider Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda that followed, acknowledged the specific effect of armed conflict on women and aimed to promote women's role in preventing and resolving conflict by ensuring female representation in peace processes, post-conflict reconstruction, and peace building (Braniff & Whiting, 2017).

Within the context of conflict resolution and transitional justice, feminist scholars argue how women's role in violence as well as the pursuit of peace continues to go unrecognised;

> The gap between policy and practice in gender and transitional justice is acute. The global study on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 found that transitional justice mechanisms have paid limited attention to women's experiences of conflict, their priorities and needs, and the significance of pervasive gender inequalities

> and biases that limit women's meaningful participation at every level and stage of postconflict transition. (Ahmed et al., 2016, pp. 527–528)

Despite commitment at an international level, the WPS agenda is criticised for continuing to place women as victims of violence which serve to reinforce 'protective stereotypes' that marginalise women as political actors (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010, Charlesworth, 2008). Accompanying this is the assumption that women are better than men at developing and sustaining peace. Whilst the expectations are that women can, and should, come together over their common female identity and opposition to conflict, similar demands are not made of men (Side, 2015). In dealing with the legacy of conflict through transitional justice mechanisms, a gender sensitive approach which also maps out the diversity of experiences and memories is called for to 'help cement the path to a peaceful post conflict society' (Meertens & Zambrano, 2010, p. 206).

The WPS agenda, which fits under a liberal peace building model, has been framed within the language of universal human rights and the importance of gender equality for nation states to make the transition away from conflict to democracy. Yet, in dealing with historical legacies this universalism can clash with attempts to acknowledge the diversity of experiences and the plurality of perspectives. Research by Debuysere (2016) explores this dynamic through the case study of the women's movement in Tunisia following the removal of President Ben Ali in January 2011. Before 2011, the women's movement was characterised by state-sponsored and top-down secular feminism, in which the Tunisian state promoted women's rights to disguise its authoritarian nature. The aftermath of the Tunisian uprising saw a growth in women's associations, many of which originated from Islamist circles and worked within Islamic tradition (Marks, 2013). Across the post uprising landscape tensions appeared between liberal and secular feminist groups – based on individual freedom and rights – and Islamic feminism. Islamist women's rights activists believe women and men have complementary, instead of absolute equal, roles within the family. Although equal in value, husbands and wives have different responsibilities within the family due to biological differences' (Debuysere, 2016, p. 230). As a consequence, there is a reluctance by some

Islamist women to accept elements relating to equality in marriage and family relations within international conventions (such as CEDAW, article 16) (Baderin, 2003, pp. 58–66).

Whilst from different ideological positions, the deepest division between secular and Islamic feminism is rooted in the legacy of the state's monopolization of secular feminism and oppression, imprisonment and discrimination against Islamist women (Debuysere, 2016, pp. 233–234). Rather than bringing different groups together under the single feminist umbrella of universal human rights, Debuysere suggests Mouffe's (2005) notions of 'conflictual consensus' and 'agonistic pluralism' can encourage a process of dialogue and provide a space where political conflict can be positively channelled – from antagonisms to agonisms.
This case study argues that the language of universal rights can cover up the diverse experiences and identities shaped by historical legacies and raises important questions relating to the management of the past in a way that accommodates multiple perspectives and facilitates a process of cross-ideological dialogue.

Conclusion

DisTerrMem provides an opportunity in which to consider how distinct, but inter-related, ways of remembering the past impact social relationships in the present. Examining these dynamics through a gendered lens is revealing of how nationalist projects construct the past but also how gender identities in the present are shaped by history.

In nationalistic constructions of the past, the essentialised positions of masculinity/ femininity fit with antagonisitic forms of memory that extends to other binary notions of us/them, good/evil and heroes/villains. In the context of conflict these essentialised constructions are extended to women as passive victims and men as the heroes. Such removal of agency serves to blinds us to the possibility of women as perpetrators, witnesses, traitors, as well as victims.

In moving towards a more cosmopolitan frame, at the start of the twenty-first century the international community turned to address the unique impact of conflict on women. What begun through UNSCR 1325 and then pursued through the wider WPS agenda was the principle that the inclusion of women was essential in the transition away from violence and movement towards building new democratic societies of universal rights and values. For critics, these efforts serve to reinforce a protectionist position that continues to view women as victims, whilst the liberal feminist approach of promoting inclusion overlooks power dynamics and structures that continue to reinforce these gender inequalities. Within this frame is also the notion that 'women are better at peace', often promoting women's groups and civil society actors to reach across societal divides based on their shared identity of being female, whilst not expecting similar demands of men.

DisTerrMem provides an opportunity to explore whether the application of agonistic memory can provide an alternative approach to remembering the past that awards agency and goes beyond essentialist constructions of gender. Alongside this it is important to break down a universal 'gendered experiences' of past conflict by acknowledging other intersecting identities (e.g. class, race, LGBTQ+, caste). Agonism therefore has the potential to embrace multi-perspectivity in order to move beyond passive victimhood and acknowledge the various roles women play in conflict and peace building (politicians, armed fighters, negotiators, community leaders, spy etc.). Finally, it is also crucial to note how women's experiences of past conflict is often found in the silences rather than the history books, state narratives, public commemorative spaces and dominant discourses. A key challenge is therefore how to reveal multiple perspectives of a past that is hidden and contains experiences of trauma through appropriate and compassionate methodologies.

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The role of diaspora in fostering the memory of the Armenian genocide abroad - Philippe Lecrivain

Focusing on the case of Armenia, lawyer Philippe Lecrivian (Educational and Cultural Bridges, Armenia), discusses the role of diaspora in supporting and challenging domestic politics and foreign policy. Philippe sets out how, from the 1960s onwards, the Armenian diaspora intensified their efforts for genocide recognition internationally and influenced politics of the 'homeland'.

In his article *Qu'est-ce que les diasporas* ['What are diasporas'] and his book 'Diasporas', Stéphane Dufoix (2006) defines the root of the term 'diaspora' as the dispersion of the Jews and, by extension, that of other religious groups. Subsequently, this concept expanded to include those living outside their homeland and structured trade networks.

Nicholas Van Hear (1998) recommended using three basic criteria to define diasporas:

- The population is dispersed from a homeland to two or more other territories;
- The presence abroad is enduring, although exile is not necessarily permanent, but may include movement between homeland and new host;
- There is some kind of exchange – social, economic, political or cultural – between or among the spatially separated populations comprising the diaspora.

In her article *La diaspora arménienne* ['The Armenian Diaspora'], Anouch Kunth (2007) noted that, in the early 1920s, Ottoman Armenians who had survived the genocide in 1915 made up the largest share of the Armenian diaspora in France. In parallel, there were also several hundred Armenians from the Russian Caucasus, many of whom had fled to France to escape the Bolshevik conflict at home. A comparison between the Ottoman Armenians and those from the Russian Caucasus reveals one overarching Armenian community with different traits.

This diaspora has elements in common, including the fact that individuals have had to flee their homeland (the Ottoman Empire or the Russian Empire) and above all the memory of the home they have had to leave behind. However, they are the product of very different social circumstances. The Russian Caucasus Armenians come from a privileged social class and speak Russian, while the Ottoman Armenians are often from poor, agricultural backgrounds.

Russian Caucasus Armenians moved to Paris (to neighbourhoods on the west side of the city) because they had the financial means and continued to speak Russian. Ottoman Armenians went to France and earned very little as labourers. They tended to settle in industrial towns, continuing to speak Armenian as they were ashamed of speaking Turkish, viewed as the language of their persecutors.

Despite some considerable disparities across the Armenian diaspora in North America (mainly in the U.S.) France and Russia, two common elements existed: the Armenian Apostolic Church and the 1915 Genocide.

Anson Rabinbach (2008) examines the notion of genocide as proposed by Raphael Lemkin in his article to once again push Armenians both at home and abroad to seek genocide recognition. This term was invented to denote the premediated elimination of the Jews in Europe at the hands of Hitler's regime. In her book, 'Problem from Hell. America and the Age of Genocide', (2013) Pulitzer Prize winner Samantha supported Lemkin's theory stating that the Genocide Convention could be considered "Lemkin's Law".

According to the second article of the UN convention on the prevention and punishment of crime of genocide, "genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

By inventing the term 'genocide', Lemkin did not simply set out to label a crime that had, until then, gone unnamed; he also wanted to denote two different types of crime – murder and ethnocide – using a single term.

Gérard Chaliand's foreword to Raymond Kévorkian's (2006) book includes a quotation from a speech delivered by Lemkin in 1949: "It was only after the extermination of 1,200,000 Armenians during the First World War that the victorious allies promised the survivors of this abominable massacre both a law and a hearing. Nothing ever came of this promise." Indeed, this is what the Treaty of Sèvres set out to do. Rabinbach (2008) explains that in Lemkin's memoirs, he was particularly marked by two genocides: the Kishinev pogrom and the Armenian Genocide of 1915.

Following the assassination of Taalat Pasha, the Turkish Interior Minister, the perpetrator, Salomon Telieran, was tried and acquitted by a court in Berlin in March 1921. Indeed, to this day, no prosecutions have occurred and the lack of recognition by Turkey drives the Armenians who are still in their homeland and the diaspora to seek acknowledgement. The desire for the wider recognition for the Armenian genocide began to be expressed more vehemently only in the 1960s and this was for two reasons:

- Until that point, Armenians in the diaspora wanted to become integrated in their host country;
- The death of almost every member of the Armenian elite during the genocide partly explains the delayed mobilisation of the Armenian people.

New elites created by the process of integration now had the chance to demonstrate their influence, thanks to the widespread demand for recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Vahakn Dadrian and Raymond Kévorskian are prime examples of the new elites that started to mobilise in the 1960s. Marian (2015) argues that Vahakn Dadrian studied the archives of diplomats allied with the Ottoman Empire. He discovered that the Armenian Genocide had its own Schindler: Leslie Davies, the American Consul in Kharpert. Raymond Kévorkian (2006) collected statements from survivors, which revealed that the Syrian camps in Deir ez-

Zor were used as concentration camps. Much later, these studies on the genocide, along with numerous others, would bear fruit.

In his article, 'History, memory, and international relations: The Armenian diaspora and Armenian-Turkish Relations', Vicken Cheterian (2010) describes the influence of the diaspora on Armenia. He also states that Armenian researchers and activists intensified their efforts in the 1980s, making it more difficult for people to deny the genocide. Furthermore, they maintained that an increasing number of analyses carried out by researchers who were not Armenian made it possible to discern a general pattern in genocide studies, thereby making it even harder to negate the genocide.

Some researchers began this process as early as the 1960s. The year 1965 saw the first commemorations of the genocide in Armenia, which was then still part of the Soviet Union. The memory of the genocide gradually started to return. In the 1970s, the fight for recognition of the genocide took a more violent turn in the form of acts of terrorism. One of the first of these acts was committed by Gourgen Yanikian (who happened to be a survivor of the genocide) in 1973 who murdered two Turkish diplomats in Los Angeles.

In 1975, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) assassinated several Turkish diplomats. Vicken Cheterian (2010) states that the "ASALA's terrorist campaign managed to mobilise an entire new generation of young Armenians and to breathe new life into the political mobilisation of the diaspora." This mobilisation was both financial and political.

In his book, *Le génocide arménien: De la mémoire outragée à la mémoire partagée* [The Armenian Genocide: From Outraged Memory to Shared Memory], Michel Marian (2015) describes the way in which diaspora Armenians were able to exert a political influence that sometimes had an impact. In democratic countries where there are many Armenians, they have an influence mainly at a local and then national level. Monuments in memory of victims of the genocide were built in towns or cities that were home to many Armenians. In France, the mayors of large cities with a strong Armenian presence raised the matter of genocide recognition with François Mitterrand. Michel Marian (2015) states that "whatever

the experience and skill of the Armenian lobby groups, their power is not based on their skill or even on their activists or leaders; it lies in the voluntary service of a considerable number of members of the community who are always prepared to meet politicians and to lobby them or write to them in defence of the same simple objective that they have shared for decades."

This lobbying paid off. In 1985, the "Whitacker Report" by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities recognised "the Ottoman massacre of Armenians in 1915-16" as genocide. This lead to the parliaments of around twenty countries recognising the genocide, including Russia, France and Lebanon. Other nations have yet to recognise the genocide, including the U.S., UK, Israel and Turkey.

Despite not officially recognising the genocide, the U.S. has discussed recognition several times. President Reagan was the first president to utter the word "genocide" on 22 April 1981. Barack Obama vowed to recognise the Armenian Genocide but broke his promise by talking not of genocide but of "Meds Yeghern". Samantha Power (2013) fiercely criticises the American government, not only because it has refused for 40 years to ratify the Genocide Convention but also because it has neglected to apply pressure to set up international, legal and military mechanisms to prevent and to sanction genocide. The American Congress almost voted to recognise the genocide but failed to do so because the concept of genocide was limited to extermination carried out by a radical ideology.

Subsequently, in 1987, the European Parliament made the accession of Turkey to the European Union dependent on it acknowledging the Armenian Genocide. Then, in 2001, France publicly acknowledged the genocide with a declarative law.

Returning to Vicken Cheterian's (2010) article, since Armenia became independent in 1991, a large number from the diaspora were elected to join the Armenian government from 1991. For example, Raffi Hovanessian, the first Foreign Affairs Minister of Armenia. Moreover, the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian was from a diaspora family that returned to Soviet Armenia in 1948. However, these representatives of the Armenian diaspora had a moderate influence on Armenian politics.

As part of political negotiations to normalise relations between Turkey and Armenia, two bi-lateral protocols, referred to collectively as the Zurich Protocols, were signed on 10 October 2009 by the Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Edward Nalbandyan and his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu. The Protocols failed to mention the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh or a deadline for ratification, which was required from parliaments of both countries. Criticisms from within Armenia and across the Armenian diaspora, particularly vocal in the US, centred on the Protocols' mutual recognition of existing borders without Turkey's acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide. These protocols, signed by both parties, yet never ratified in their respective parliaments, demonstrated the divergence between the Armenian diaspora and the Armenian State. It is also important to note that during his world tour in October 2009, before signing the protocols, President Serzh Sargsyan had to face fierce protests particularly in France, Los Angeles (12,000 people) and Bayreuth. Phillips (2012; 89) goes as far as to argue the negotiations around the Protocol 'renewed the Diaspora's engagement in Armenia's future'.

Indeed, the diaspora sought genocide recognition at all costs, which was no longer feasible with the signing of the protocols. For Armenia, the genocide was one of many ways of forming a modern political identity that would later take on several layers: the Sovietisation of Armenia and the purges under Stalin; the Second World War and the loss of 160,000 Armenian fighters; the struggles of the Breshnev era and especially the rise of the Karabakh movement, which provided the ideological basis for the independence of Armenia.

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Collective Memory: The Politics of 'Remembering' and 'Reminding' - M. Usman Farooq

In this final section M. Usman Farooq (Forman Christian College, Pakistan) explores the politics of memory through Halbwachs' conception of 'collective memory' and goes on to question how politicians can play a critical role in both reciting, and challenging, dominant state led discourses of identity and nation-hood.

This discussion surveys the literature on the influence of memory on the present: particularly on 'the politics in present'. It focuses on the politics of remembering (or reminding) and the role of politicians as creators and replicators of the state-led discourse and also considers potential channels of dissent and counter-memory. However, before investigating the role of individual politicians in reciting state-led discourses, it is significant to review one of the fundamental questions of collective memory studies on the link between individual and collective memory. The underlying assumption for reviewing the link between individual and collective memory is strongly connected to the main subject of this review: while politicians act and (re)construct past narratives in their individualistic capacity, the impact and influence of their actions and narratives represent and appeals to a larger audience of the collective and shared memory. There exists a delicate relationship between the individualistic representation of a deliberately chosen past and its (re)construction as collective and shared past of a whole group.

In recent history, the subject of 'memory' or 'remembering' has been the pinnacle of the debates, especially in cultural studies, mainly because of its important role in shaping societal life and its use and misuse (Assmann 2006). Its growing significance is also due to the reasons deeply connected to the social, cultural and political developments, especially in the post war era, that emerged in the backdrop of the declining 'modernist narratives of progressive improvement through an ever-expanding welfare state' (Olick et al 2011, 3). In its complex composition, memory 'is a collective phenomenon but it only manifests itself in the actions and statements of individuals' (Kansteiner 2002, 180). These 'actions and statements', when committed and expressed by those who have the political power in a particular state or a country, often have broader meanings and greater implications for

wider society or a group. Therefore, politicians often use the memory of the past 'strategically, manipulating memory to legitimize their actions with reference to formative events in the collective consciousness of their community (Hayden 1992, cited in Verovsek 2016, 529).

The next section will briefly review the classical literature on the link between the individual and collective memory. The final section of this review will outline some of the empirical studies, particularly on investigating the role of the individual politicians in creating or replicating the state-led discourses using the 'past' or 'past memories' as a tool for politics in the present.

Collective Memory: From 'Personal' to 'Group and Social Memory'

As an academic concept, 'collective memory' has its roots in modern social science and humanities through the work of 20th century French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (Verovsek, 2016). Initially, Halbwachs was interested in what Henri Bergson referred to as the 'variability of memory'; that despite the growing 'standardization' of time and 'rationalization' of societal life in modernizing societies, 'individual memory was still highly variable, sometimes recording short periods in intense detail and long periods in only the vaguest outline' (Olick et al 2011, 17). Bergson believed that this 'variability in memory', was mainly due to the 'variability of *individual* experience'.

Contrary to Bergson's reasoning, Emile Durkheim, contemporary to both Halbwachs and Bergson, later argued that this 'variability in memory' is not based on the vagaries of subjective experience, but the differences among forms of social organization and therefore focused upon how 'different *societies* produce different conception of time' (ibid, 17). Durkheim went on to develop a sociological framework, which would later be utilized by Halbwachs in his analyses on the collective memory. For Halbwachs, memory was not only mediated by social structures, but is in fact shaped by them; 'It is in society that people

normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories' (1992: 38).

Bergson, Durkheim and Halbwachs agree on the variability of experiences (hence 'variability in memory'), yet whilst Bergson traces the reason of this variability to individuals, Durkheim and Halbwachs acknowledge that individuals do not participate in memory in 'isolation' or separate to social structures. On the 'variability of memory', Halbwachs believed that the form memory takes varies according to social organization. All 'individual remembering' therefore takes place 'with social materials, within social contexts, and in response to social cues. Even when we do it alone, we do so as social beings with reference to our social identities' (Olick 2008, 156). The act of 'remembrance', by the individuals, is done in a mutually inclusive way to their respective groups. While they remember what interests them personally, at the same time, individuals are 'able to act merely as a group member, helping to evoke and maintain impersonal remembrances of interest to the group' (Halbwachs 1980, 50). Therefore, the groups 'to which any individual belongs are primary even in the most apparently individual remembering' (Olick et al 2011, 18).

'Group memory', in this regard, compliments individual memory, to the extent that it becomes 'impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of their group contexts' (Olick et al 2011, 18). And '(t)he collective memory, for its part, encompasses the individual memories while remaining distinct from them' (Halbwachs 1980, 51). These are often 'intermingled' to the extent that 'the individual memory, in order to corroborate and make precise and even to cover the gaps in its remembrances, relies upon, relocates itself within, momentarily merges with, the collective memory" (Ibid., 50). Taking Halbwachs conceptualisation of 'collective memory', the next section continues to explore how this can be utilised within the political sphere.

The Memory Politics: The Politics in 'Remembering' and 'Re-minding'

The politics of memory or memory politics, as defined by Boyarin, refers to 'rhetoric about the past mobilized for political purposes' (Boyarin 1994, 2). The conceptualization of

collective memory, as a subject of academic inquiry by French philosopher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1925), sparked debates concerning the politics of memory (or memory politics). Some of these debates include the political role of collective memory in creating the legitimacy of a nation state through the remembrance and recollection of the past (Olick et al, 2011), or to 'mobilize remembrance as an instrument of politics' (Verovsek 2016, 529), or to create 'tradition' (Hobsbawm, 2000), or the reshaping of identities in the present by altering, or omitting, particular events of 'shame', in the past (Ergur 2009).

The politics of remembering is fundamentally dependent on political narratives that often originate from collective experiences, achievements, and sufferings that leave deep impression on the collective 'conscious' of a group, community and a society. It is in the narratives that the memories of different events are embedded, and without narratives, memories are but some fragments of moments and thoughts. As Chamberlain and Thompson (1998) argue, 'Memories contain and are contained by a narrative which orders, links and makes sense of the past, the present and the future.' And it is the 'ordering' and 'making sense' of the past—in broader sense 'time'—that makes narratives a 'formidable instruments of politics' (Kotkin, cited in Verovsek 2016). In creating or replicating these narratives, politicians often play a role of a conductor, using the baton of the past memory, to direct the political narratives in the orchestra of the history of a nation. Their role can be of 'reimagining' the past in answering to the issues of 'identity' and 'unity' in the present (Colak 2006), or, in case of Germany's Nazi past, considering it 'as an ineluctable burden' (Olick & Levy 1998, 921).

Various studies have focused on the usage of the collective memory of the past by politicians in absorbing to the needs of the present politics. Gavriely-Nuri (2013) highlights the use of the collective memory by two prime ministers of Israel, namely Ariel Sharon (in office 2001-2005) and Ehud Olmert (in office 2006-2009) as an example. While collective memory has been perceived as static reality, Gaveriely-Nuri argues, that its political power as a metaphor 'promotes specific political agendas in a manner resembling those personal memories that act as 'road signs' directing people toward various goals while shaping their

positions and behavior' (2013, 56). With similar approach, Yoder (2017) analyzed 54 speeches of German Chancellor Angel Merkel over the period of 10 years to assess her usage of the past and concluded that 'Merkel draws upon several pasts—from different points in time and from different configurations of Germany—to present an integrated collective memory for a unified Germany' (2017, 660).

Eric Langenbacher (2014) in his extensive investigation on the role of memory in influencing and shaping the foreign policy of post-war Germany highlights how various politicians play a diverse role in shaping or shifting the collective memory of a nation and its influence on policy. While it is clear, from the empirical data Langenbacher presented, that Germany's foreign policy choices are in line with its 'Determination of national interest based on a cost-benefit calculus and willingness to push through such interests even with recalcitrant targets…' (Langenbacher 2014, 69). At the same time, Germany's culture of remembering or 'culture of memory', he argues, 'has deeply conditioned the values, thought patterns, and behaviors of German policymakers' (Ibid., 70).

It is difficult to specify the role of politicians in creating or replicating the narratives of the nation state as one of the channels of remembering. The several cases reviewed above, demonstrate the use of different memory modes, or what Bull and Hansen (2016) highlight as both 'cosmopolitan' and 'antagonistic' modes of remembering. However, there are two primary issues that can be addressed in further research on the role of politicians and memory. Firstly, on the empirical side, despite having an apparent 'cosmopolitan mode' of remembering the past, as also argued by Langenbacher (2014), the policy choices remain in line with national interest—and that national interest can be of any nature. In this regard, the further empirical research can be carried out in focusing on the influence of the past memory on the policy choices made by the politicians. Secondly, from a theoretical perspective, some further research should be focused on what Bull and Hansen (2016) refer to as 'agonistic memory', to analyze whether this third memory mode is in coherence with the Durkheimian framework of the social structures and the 'variability of experiences' and 'variability in memory'. The coherence or in coherence of 'the agonistic memory' with

Durkheim's framework of social structures as key to the 'variability' in experience and memory can open a new field within collective memory studies that can relate or analyze the changing or changed social structures. In this regard, the role of politicians can also be analyzed as (re)presenters or responders of the changing or changed social structure and its influence on the 'mode of remembering'.

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